From a
Girardian perspective, however, where every human motivation and action has
precedence in mimetic desire, both the political demagogue and the loving
mimeticist need also to be seen with a view to particular mechanisms of mimetic
desire that actuate them. In broad strokes, the demagogue seems to be actuated first and foremost by
way of internal mediation of his political rivals’ desires, perceived as
envious and ressentiment-filled, as they play out in the public arena (while
his followers largely by that of his rivals’ followers), on top of more than
just a kick-starter of external mediation of some “worthy” exemplars of
political demagoguery, be they contemporary foreigners or historical figures; whereas
the loving mimeticist is actuated by way of external mediation of a benevolent
model’s perceived or imagined desires and motivation as reflected in his/her
actions, preserved sayings and other written records.
The present
essay attempts to see the mimetic triangle as introduced and elaborated by Rene
Girard first and foremost as being about relative power in relationships, about
dynamic distribution thereof. Being a commonplace in the political arena, the mimetic
triangle is predominately about gaining or maintaining power on a mass scale using
its dynamics. And when a demagogue enters the political scene, sooner rather
than later, if not from the very beginning, it is exclusively about power,
about cornering power therein. Demagogues are naturals at exploiting mimetic
power dynamics to their advantage. Plus, if mimetic theory has any clue, their
armamentarium is vastly superior to that of a benevolent leader, especially one
inspired by Christianity: unlike the latter they can fall back on and exploit
to their advantage the scapegoat mechanism. In fact, one doesn’t have to be
mimetic theory-literate to appreciate its potential in political struggle. Recent
neuroscientific research suggests that dominant people’s brains entrain those
of submissive people as they synchronize while interacting. It follows that a
masterly demagogue might be able to effect that via social or mass media.
xxx
Contemporary liberal
democracy arguably increasingly ceases to be “liberal,” unless that designation
is limited to signify just one, currently predominant, neoliberal variety. But in
caring only to safeguard at all costs what neoliberalism stands for first and
foremost, i.e., a global (ostensibly) free market, contemporary liberal
democracy tends to produce an inequality that must be glossed over by political
demagogues foisting themselves on top of an electorate divided on whatever
basis that would work for them – other than wealth and true privilege. Then
from their vantage positions at the top they would have one part of the under-
or less-privileged set upon the other, with them leading the fray on both
sides. In the process liberal democracy also tends to shed its plurality, apparently hardly caring
any more about many of its recent constitutive elements, such as mutual respect and
tolerance as shared values that underlie any conception of the common good
therein. It is reflected in and/or
driven by a gradual diminishment of the intended role of its institutional
checks and balances, or worse yet, their blatant enlistment in partisan
politics. Without their sufficient countervailing influence liberal democracy
tends to devolve into “pure” democracy, such as greatest philosophers, starting
with Plato, were sternly warning against. Given the current starting point of
that process – the greatest centralization of state power that history has ever
known, concurrent globalization processes as a backdrop notwithstanding – demagogues
that this devolution tends to produce at an ever faster rate are given
opportunities to get hold of more power than ever has been possible to date.
Naturally they use it to undermine the remaining bases of plurality in society,
or do away with them altogether. Also, their squashing or abusing of systems of
checks and balances in the name of “people” democracy goes hand in hand with an
ever increasing centralization of the state, a process that will not be
completed until they are in a position to do away with the democracy itself.
What
currently thwarts their efforts and gives them pause is a phenomenon that canonical
mimetic theory seems unable to explain if not is totally oblivious to, viz., an
ever deepening polarization splitting society almost exactly in half on any
issue of consequence – instead of polarizing it against a single person or group,
i.e., a scapegoat, in an unwitting push to obtain societal peace at its
expense. It can perhaps be explained, however, in terms of pure power dynamics:
in place of liberal democracy’s ever weakening systems of checks and balances
and the concomitant lack of public trust what seems to be maintaining a semblance
of societal peace is a power equilibrium, inherently unstable though it is, that
is holding for the time being, an equilibrium resulting from an almost equal
power apparently mustered by both inimical sides – their relative powers
determined by their almost equal sizes, both sides’ constant reconstituting
notwithstanding. In fact if and when the precarious balance is tipped to the
advantage of a demagogue-led illiberal movement liberal democracy’s days will
be numbered – as currently seems to be the case with Hungary.
xxx
Now the political demagogue’s malevolent actions
should best be seen as deliberate manipulations, especially his use of
scapegoating of whole populations – his main tool, even if much of his dealings
in the public arena with his counterparts, i.e., demagogues on the other end of
the political spectrum, may be in the mold of internal mediation of desire, and
thus mostly unwitting. How then can mimetic theory, a theory that focuses chiefly
on the randomness of scapegoating and imitation, that analyzes the mimetic
process predominantly from the standpoint of the passive or unwitting imitator
lacking personal autonomy, be of any help when scrutinizing demagoguery and its
appeal? Well, there is a body of work by Jean-Michel Oughourlian that contains
valuable insights concerning the role of hypnotic suggestion in mimesis as seen
within the context of mimetic theory. They may be able to shed light on the processes
inherent in the malevolent use of hypnotic suggestion and hypnotic induction in
a mimetic power relationship when one of its sides deliberately sets out to
influence the other. In order to appreciate their unfolding in the political
arena one would do well to glean and combine relevant insights especially from his
two books, Psychopolitics and The Mimetic Brain.
In short: political demagogues are adept at
introducing power into public mimetic relationships – in order to manipulate
them. Instead of being about the unwitting imitation of a model (external
mimesis) or rival (internal mimesis; which, however, can also be the basis of
loving mimesis) on the part of the imitator acting in
the political arena, mimesis then reverses direction and becomes one about
suggestion first and foremost (although the manipulator also feeds on his
followers’ adulation that he has managed to generate in the first place), a
suggestion foisted on “a crowd with only two members” (Freud) who in that arena
multiply into a malleable mass. In the contemporary West its members either resist
him as rival (the case of those who oppose the demagogue for reasons often
scarcely recognized or acknowledged, yet somehow reflective – though often seemingly
randomly – of their various personal narratives and social circumstances; very
few of his opponents are able to simply reject or dismiss him – and then be
mostly indifferent to him – rather than resisting him in a mimetic fashion, as
their antimodel, whether or not having first recognized their desires’ alterity
– antithetical as it is to his – and him as their locus, and staying
adversatively involved with him); or imitate him as model (his followers).“[W]hat
leads to the abandonment of freedom and to dependency is the ‘need for
direction,’ that is to say the path of least resistance for mimetic desire,
which delegates the choice not of a single object but of all its objects to a
single, absolute model,” says Oughourlian with regard to model imitation from
the perspective of the follower. Based on an initial single-issue attraction, she
or he then is led to follow unreflectively the demagogue’s whole agenda, while
his opponents do the same in reverse: repulsed perhaps by his (demagogical in
their eyes) stance on a single issue of importance to them, the dynamic leads
them not so much to simply reject his whole agenda as to resist it in a mimetic
fashion – for the duration, until in fact their resentment is trumped by that
toward another, suddenly more worthy subject. If unchecked somehow, the process
as envisioned here tends to be self-feeding and evidently ever more polarizing.
Additionally, it is easy to see from the above (and the likes of James Madison
and Edmund Burke saw it clearly) that the so called mob rule never is what it
is purported to be: its agenda is manipulatively foisted on them by a ruthless
demagogue rather than somehow decided in a “purely” democratic process. It is
he rather than the mob by themselves that insinuates into the process the
scapegoat mechanism, in order to solidify their nascent uniformity and support
for him.
xxx
In the face
of political power apparently being accumulated and distributed via constantly
reconfigured mimetic triangles that tend to encompass ever widening circles of
people – what actually can be done? How to counteract the inordinate
accumulation of power by unscrupulous political demagogues who consciously or
unwittingly use or instinctively fall back on every trick imaginable from the armamentarium
of mimetic theory to create and hold mimetic mobs in their thrall? It is a hard
goal to accomplish, not least because it would be very difficult to effect a
socially and psychologically acceptable equilibrium in a situation marked by such
strong mimetic dynamics.
Yet every step of the process of the current devolution of
liberal democracy described above can be elucidated with the help of mimetic
theory (some of it perhaps uncanonical), something that has hardly been done in
any systematic way so far, as well as measures proposed that might be used in
attempts to thwart its sinister unfolding. Arguably, the theory’s most needful
use would be elucidation of anything having to do with the rise to power of
demagogues in a contemporary liberal democracy that undergoes such convulsions.
Moreover, there is a possibility to elaborate a positive scenario here, viz.,
that of fostering the emergence of benevolent leaders, such as would be ready
for self-sacrifice themselves. The latter characteristic is the only element of
this whole process tangentially touched upon by Girard – when on occasion he
would mention, almost in passing, the need to imitate Jesus or those who
imitate him.
What at a
minimum needs to be done is to field or support political leaders who would
embrace an agenda prominently featuring fostering a climate of societal
tolerance (while, on the downside, curbing hate speech in social media) and
trust, as well as promoting political and social pluralism and diversity (including
in the field of economic activity). But in view of the
theory’s focus on the dangerous dynamics of internal mediation inherent in excessive
societal uniformity mimetic theory could also be put to use to shed light on
changes to the institutional shape of liberal democracy that need to be
implemented to prevent giving free rein to demagogues in those circumstances (though
the theory’s concentration, limited and reactionary, is on dangers having to do
with abolishing social hierarchies): polarizing mimetic dynamics attendant upon the workings of demagogues would have
to be seen for what they are and effectively circumscribed in scope as well as
sapped of as much of its harmful energy as possible. To effect a societal
reconfiguration that would successfully embody those insights, adopted measures would arguably have to include institutionalizing
and safeguarding a decentralization of the state that would make extensive use
of the principle of subsidiarity; possibly employing a principle of supermajority in
referendums ratifying major or radical changes, such as constitutional reforms
or gaining national independence; as well as introducing greater reliance on a participatory democracy that
would be guided by a consensus-seeking spirit, especially at the local level, with
a view to promoting egalitarian communitarianism and cooperation based on people’s affinities of
interests and values.
Q & A
Q: My understanding is that Girard claims that Jesus broke Satan's
snare and as a result scapegoating has lost its efficacy. Doesn't that explain
why we polarize into factions that oppose each other instead of restoring peace
via an eternal return to mythical, single-victim ritual sacrifice? Doesn't his
theory predict that without a complete renunciation of violence we are left
with ever escalating conflict in human affairs?
A: Yes, it does. Yet, as mentioned above, the present take is a bit
noncanonical as far as mimetic theory goes, in the sense that Girard did not
seem to have predicted or perhaps even considered as highly probable that
“scapegoating losing its efficacy” should in fact in liberal democracy take the
route of splitting society in half. I argue that otherwise demagogues would
still be able to polarize it against a single person or group, i.e., a
scapegoat – in a way that would be “efficacious.”
Not that societal sacrifice doesn’t happen anymore, it does
in a major way, through economic exclusion, etc.; it is often invisible to
society, as we all know. But there is no unity and peace around that sacrifice,
it doesn’t make for a unified society, it is not celebrated any more by the
whole society. And if a demagogue chooses scapegoating as a way of gaining
support, his “officiating” at an exclusionary ritual is vigorously opposed by
half of it.
The point is that this splitting in half that accompanies polarization is what
guarantees that “efficaciousness” does not return. If, however, one of the
sides begins to become relatively stronger, a dynamic sets in whereby in the
long run the demagogue controlling it is able to make sure that the other side
is cowed into submission, and perhaps eventually disintegrates. Bending or
breaking the rules of liberal democracy is how the demagogue’s support is then
solidified – to make sure that the other side cannot regain its lost strength/numbers,
that nothing is standing in the way of scapegoating and public sacrificial
rituals returning as his tools of choice. Democracy becomes nothing more than a
façade. That is what is happening right now in Hungary. And of course all of that
is a long way from our renouncing violence altogether.
