From a Girardian perspective, however, where every human motivation and action has precedence in mimetic desire, both the political demagogue and the loving mimeticist need also to be seen with a view to particular mechanisms of mimetic desire that actuate them. In broad strokes, the demagogue seems to be actuated first and foremost by way of internal mediation of his political rivals’ desires, perceived as envious and ressentiment-filled, as they play out in the public arena (while his followers largely by that of his rivals’ followers), on top of more than just a kick-starter of external mediation of some “worthy” exemplars of political demagoguery, be they contemporary foreigners or historical figures; whereas the loving mimeticist is actuated by way of external mediation of a benevolent model’s perceived or imagined desires and motivation as reflected in his/her actions, preserved sayings and other written records.
The present essay attempts to see the mimetic triangle as introduced and elaborated by Rene Girard first and foremost as being about relative power in relationships, about dynamic distribution thereof. Being a commonplace in the political arena, the mimetic triangle is predominately about gaining or maintaining power on a mass scale using its dynamics. And when a demagogue enters the political scene, sooner rather than later, if not from the very beginning, it is exclusively about power, about cornering power therein. Demagogues are naturals at exploiting mimetic power dynamics to their advantage. Plus, if mimetic theory has any clue, their armamentarium is vastly superior to that of a benevolent leader, especially one inspired by Christianity: unlike the latter they can fall back on and exploit to their advantage the scapegoat mechanism. In fact, one doesn’t have to be mimetic theory-literate to appreciate its potential in political struggle. Recent neuroscientific research suggests that dominant people’s brains entrain those of submissive people as they synchronize while interacting. It follows that a masterly demagogue might be able to effect that via social or mass media.
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Contemporary liberal democracy arguably increasingly ceases to be “liberal,” unless that designation is limited to signify just one, currently predominant, neoliberal variety. But in caring only to safeguard at all costs what neoliberalism stands for first and foremost, i.e., a global (ostensibly) free market, contemporary liberal democracy tends to produce an inequality that must be glossed over by political demagogues foisting themselves on top of an electorate divided on whatever basis that would work for them – other than wealth and true privilege. Then from their vantage positions at the top they would have one part of the under- or less-privileged set upon the other, with them leading the fray on both sides. In the process liberal democracy also tends to shed its plurality, apparently hardly caring any more about many of its recent constitutive elements, such as mutual respect and tolerance as shared values that underlie any conception of the common good therein. It is reflected in and/or driven by a gradual diminishment of the intended role of its institutional checks and balances, or worse yet, their blatant enlistment in partisan politics. Without their sufficient countervailing influence liberal democracy tends to devolve into “pure” democracy, such as greatest philosophers, starting with Plato, were sternly warning against. Given the current starting point of that process – the greatest centralization of state power that history has ever known, concurrent globalization processes as a backdrop notwithstanding – demagogues that this devolution tends to produce at an ever faster rate are given opportunities to get hold of more power than ever has been possible to date. Naturally they use it to undermine the remaining bases of plurality in society, or do away with them altogether. Also, their squashing or abusing of systems of checks and balances in the name of “people” democracy goes hand in hand with an ever increasing centralization of the state, a process that will not be completed until they are in a position to do away with the democracy itself.
What currently thwarts their efforts and gives them pause is a phenomenon that canonical mimetic theory seems unable to explain if not is totally oblivious to, viz., an ever deepening polarization splitting society almost exactly in half on any issue of consequence – instead of polarizing it against a single person or group, i.e., a scapegoat, in an unwitting push to obtain societal peace at its expense. It can perhaps be explained, however, in terms of pure power dynamics: in place of liberal democracy’s ever weakening systems of checks and balances and the concomitant lack of public trust what seems to be maintaining a semblance of societal peace is a power equilibrium, inherently unstable though it is, that is holding for the time being, an equilibrium resulting from an almost equal power apparently mustered by both inimical sides – their relative powers determined by their almost equal sizes, both sides’ constant reconstituting notwithstanding. In fact if and when the precarious balance is tipped to the advantage of a demagogue-led illiberal movement liberal democracy’s days will be numbered – as currently seems to be the case with Hungary.
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In short: political demagogues are adept at introducing power into public mimetic relationships – in order to manipulate them. Instead of being about the unwitting imitation of a model (external mimesis) or rival (internal mimesis; which, however, can also be the basis of loving mimesis) on the part of the imitator acting in the political arena, mimesis then reverses direction and becomes one about suggestion first and foremost (although the manipulator also feeds on his followers’ adulation that he has managed to generate in the first place), a suggestion foisted on “a crowd with only two members” (Freud) who in that arena multiply into a malleable mass. In the contemporary West its members either resist him as rival (the case of those who oppose the demagogue for reasons often scarcely recognized or acknowledged, yet somehow reflective – though often seemingly randomly – of their various personal narratives and social circumstances; very few of his opponents are able to simply reject or dismiss him – and then be mostly indifferent to him – rather than resisting him in a mimetic fashion, as their antimodel, whether or not having first recognized their desires’ alterity – antithetical as it is to his – and him as their locus, and staying adversatively involved with him); or imitate him as model (his followers).“[W]hat leads to the abandonment of freedom and to dependency is the ‘need for direction,’ that is to say the path of least resistance for mimetic desire, which delegates the choice not of a single object but of all its objects to a single, absolute model,” says Oughourlian with regard to model imitation from the perspective of the follower. Based on an initial single-issue attraction, she or he then is led to follow unreflectively the demagogue’s whole agenda, while his opponents do the same in reverse: repulsed perhaps by his (demagogical in their eyes) stance on a single issue of importance to them, the dynamic leads them not so much to simply reject his whole agenda as to resist it in a mimetic fashion – for the duration, until in fact their resentment is trumped by that toward another, suddenly more worthy subject. If unchecked somehow, the process as envisioned here tends to be self-feeding and evidently ever more polarizing. Additionally, it is easy to see from the above (and the likes of James Madison and Edmund Burke saw it clearly) that the so called mob rule never is what it is purported to be: its agenda is manipulatively foisted on them by a ruthless demagogue rather than somehow decided in a “purely” democratic process. It is he rather than the mob by themselves that insinuates into the process the scapegoat mechanism, in order to solidify their nascent uniformity and support for him.
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In the face of political power apparently being accumulated and distributed via constantly reconfigured mimetic triangles that tend to encompass ever widening circles of people – what actually can be done? How to counteract the inordinate accumulation of power by unscrupulous political demagogues who consciously or unwittingly use or instinctively fall back on every trick imaginable from the armamentarium of mimetic theory to create and hold mimetic mobs in their thrall? It is a hard goal to accomplish, not least because it would be very difficult to effect a socially and psychologically acceptable equilibrium in a situation marked by such strong mimetic dynamics.
Yet every step of the process of the current devolution of liberal democracy described above can be elucidated with the help of mimetic theory (some of it perhaps uncanonical), something that has hardly been done in any systematic way so far, as well as measures proposed that might be used in attempts to thwart its sinister unfolding. Arguably, the theory’s most needful use would be elucidation of anything having to do with the rise to power of demagogues in a contemporary liberal democracy that undergoes such convulsions. Moreover, there is a possibility to elaborate a positive scenario here, viz., that of fostering the emergence of benevolent leaders, such as would be ready for self-sacrifice themselves. The latter characteristic is the only element of this whole process tangentially touched upon by Girard – when on occasion he would mention, almost in passing, the need to imitate Jesus or those who imitate him.
What at a
minimum needs to be done is to field or support political leaders who would
embrace an agenda prominently featuring fostering a climate of societal
tolerance (while, on the downside, curbing hate speech in social media) and
trust, as well as promoting political and social pluralism and diversity (including
in the field of economic activity). But in view of the
theory’s focus on the dangerous dynamics of internal mediation inherent in excessive
societal uniformity mimetic theory could also be put to use to shed light on
changes to the institutional shape of liberal democracy that need to be
implemented to prevent giving free rein to demagogues in those circumstances (though
the theory’s concentration, limited and reactionary, is on dangers having to do
with abolishing social hierarchies): polarizing mimetic dynamics attendant upon the workings of demagogues would have
to be seen for what they are and effectively circumscribed in scope as well as
sapped of as much of its harmful energy as possible. To effect a societal
reconfiguration that would successfully embody those insights, adopted measures would arguably have to include institutionalizing
and safeguarding a decentralization of the state that would make extensive use
of the principle of subsidiarity; possibly employing a principle of supermajority in
referendums ratifying major or radical changes, such as constitutional reforms
or gaining national independence; as well as introducing greater reliance on a participatory democracy that
would be guided by a consensus-seeking spirit, especially at the local level, with
a view to promoting egalitarian communitarianism and cooperation based on people’s affinities of
interests and values.
Q & A
Q: My understanding is that Girard claims that Jesus broke Satan's snare and as a result scapegoating has lost its efficacy. Doesn't that explain why we polarize into factions that oppose each other instead of restoring peace via an eternal return to mythical, single-victim ritual sacrifice? Doesn't his theory predict that without a complete renunciation of violence we are left with ever escalating conflict in human affairs?
A: Yes, it does. Yet, as mentioned above, the present take is a bit noncanonical as far as mimetic theory goes, in the sense that Girard did not seem to have predicted or perhaps even considered as highly probable that “scapegoating losing its efficacy” should in fact in liberal democracy take the route of splitting society in half. I argue that otherwise demagogues would still be able to polarize it against a single person or group, i.e., a scapegoat – in a way that would be “efficacious.”
Not that societal sacrifice doesn’t happen anymore, it does in a major way, through economic exclusion, etc.; it is often invisible to society, as we all know. But there is no unity and peace around that sacrifice, it doesn’t make for a unified society, it is not celebrated any more by the whole society. And if a demagogue chooses scapegoating as a way of gaining support, his “officiating” at an exclusionary ritual is vigorously opposed by half of it.
The point is that this splitting in half that accompanies polarization is what guarantees that “efficaciousness” does not return. If, however, one of the sides begins to become relatively stronger, a dynamic sets in whereby in the long run the demagogue controlling it is able to make sure that the other side is cowed into submission, and perhaps eventually disintegrates. Bending or breaking the rules of liberal democracy is how the demagogue’s support is then solidified – to make sure that the other side cannot regain its lost strength/numbers, that nothing is standing in the way of scapegoating and public sacrificial rituals returning as his tools of choice. Democracy becomes nothing more than a façade. That is what is happening right now in Hungary. And of course all of that is a long way from our renouncing violence altogether.
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