Some Evagrian Insights for a Girardian Ethic

Any “Girardian” ethic would arguably have to be both truly Christian in spirit and radical: while benefitting from Mimetic Theory’s insights into the mechanisms of man’s desire, it would have to be squarely based on the commandment of mutual love, “love [of] one another just as I [Christ] have loved you,” with the commandment of nonviolence, based on Sermon on the Mount passages, figuring eminently, so as to preempt scapegoating. Moreover, one would have to be exhorted to be ready to “lay down his life for his friends,” just as did Jesus the innocent scapegoat, whose self-sacrifice was meant to bring sacrificial scapegoating to an end. The process still not completed, now it is the Girardians’ turn to carry the torch, if need be. In fact, now that humanity is denied the use/moral validity of the peace-bestowing scapegoat mechanism, their responsibility is nothing less than averting the impending apocalypse by nonviolent means. If this could only be accomplished by yet another innocent-yet-willing scapegoat, one should be ready.  He/she would be the personification of the noblest ideal of that ethic, the true embodiment of the love of neighbor, of one’s society in desperate need of peace – and love. This would be a truly Girardian twist to Jesus’ commandment of seeking “to be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”

Is it even possible to formulate such a radical ethic that could then be actually put to practice? What will be demonstrated below is that there are at least two valuable sources to draw on in attempting this task. One of them serving more as a foil rather than as a true source (Buddhism), whereas the other (early Eastern Christian thought) will hopefully be shown as being surprisingly relevant as well as useful, though its goals and scope obviously do not entirely coincide with those of a prospective Girardian enquiry.

Firstly, it must be noted that nothing even close to such a radical ethic has so far been formulated in historical Christianity, and even practice of the much less demanding "love of one’s neighbor as oneself" commandment has been mostly dismal. It is Buddhism, both  in its dharma and to some extent also in its practice, that is seemingly much closer to the spirit of both Christian “love” and “nonviolence” commandments, though it arrives there from an entirely different set of basic ontological and anthropological assumptions. Paradoxically, the latter apparently have some common ground with Girardian anthropology, though their broader respective general outlooks are markedly different.

The uncanny similarity consists not only in that that both Buddhism and Mimetic Theory assign a pivotal role to desire but also in that the Mimetic-Theory-posited triangular nature of human desire unmistakably evinces the inherent nothingness of the desiring man. And though arguably this nothingness is not metaphysical or ontological (contrary arguments could also be put forward), but rather psychological, a Buddhist flavor is undeniable. Moreover, this psychological nothingness has far-reaching consequences for man as a moral agent. The Girardian mimetic interdividual comes across as much more nihilistic at his/her core than the stand-alone Buddhist pursuing his/her path of avoidance of suffering, but one imbued with loving-kindness towards their fellow humans. That love goes to redeem the Buddhist’s apparent nihilism, something that the “basic” Girardian interdividual seems to be lacking altogether.

In my opinion, moreover, it is a misperception, or misrepresentation, as the case may be, to treat Buddhism as ontologically nihilistic. Buddha’s supposed nihilism, as embodied in his no-self teaching, arguably is pedagogical in nature. It is expected to drive home his fundamental Anicca teaching, having to do with the basic impermanence of existence. On the psychological plane it can only be expected to have a lasting imprint if the metaphor of no-self is employed. And, it can be plausibly argued, that that is what Buddha actually did. I posit that a prospective MT ethic could benefit from the use of that seemingly nihilistic metaphor – at least at its mystical limits, namely when Christ-the-innermost model is to be imitated. As will be shown later on, it bears on the interplay of true love and love of self.

As mentioned above, Buddhism ties in most clearly with MT in that both assign a crucial role to desire. Buddhism, which does not view it as mimetic, has only a negative opinion of any form of desire, treating it as something to be avoided or detached from. No mileage here from this basic human endowment, responsible, as it is, for much of human learning, among other things. But not much either in MT, at least hardly anything positive as far as man as a moral agent is concerned. In both Buddhism and in MT human desire stands condemned, although on different counts.

Neither does calling MT’s internal model/obstacle of desire “metaphysical” amount to much, at least again not much positive. Yet this appellation might in fact be Girard’s giveaway of his deep intuitions. But any ontology built on a Girardian metaphysical model that is seemingly essentially negative would appear nihilistic. Unfortunately, even the moral potential of imitating the innermost model is left largely unexplored, this time possibly as this would draw Girard into yet another field altogether, namely that of theology, or even mysticism.

So it may have been Girard’s fear of nihilism permeating Mimetic Theory, as it arguably does when mimetic desire is seen as taking center stage in man, and that consequently could also compromise any ethic that might supplement it, that was decisive for his refrainment from any formulation of an ethical system on top of his anthropology. Yet given the highly moralistically charged nature of his thought AND his professed Christianity, such an effort would seem only natural. Obviously it cannot be precluded that, conceiving himself first and foremost as an anthropologist, he simply wanted to maintain purity of discourse and thus consciously chose to abstain from any foray into the field, at least in any systematic form.

Yet despite all those reservations an ethic crowning Mimetic Theory is certainly not only feasible but also called for. And from the point on in the development of MT when its author posited the innermost mediator/model, namely Jesus Christ, as the model to imitate, it need not have been nihilistic. Instead, it would have been an ethic of love. The Redeemer would have redeemed MT’s nihilism.

Now any rigorous formulation of a “Girardian” ethic, Christian – not Buddhist – in character as it doubtless would have to be, would certainly benefit from insights afforded by the early Church’s Eastern Fathers and other spiritual writers. The thought of Evagrius Ponticus, a fourth century desert monk, is especially valuable. He developed a set of eight logismoi, or evil passions, ever ready to attack man. (They eventually became the basis for the Western Church’s seven deadly sins.) What is even more important for this discussion is that they all are said to stem from the fundamental or root passion, that of philautia, or self-love.

Instead of treating the logismoi as separate entities, I tend to see them as so many manifestations of love of self. Such an approach is especially useful when collating the unfolding of the stages of mimetic desire at work in man with the Christian’s quest for perfection (or holiness or theosis, divinization), where self-love is found to be the soul’s chief obstacle to loving both God and neighbor (the basis of any Christian ethic), rearing its ugly head as it does in various situations as one is navigating one’s life. It becomes especially evident at the top of both processes, when, on the one hand, the mimesis-riven man is exhorted to fall back on Christ in His capacity of innermost model, and when, on the other hand, the Christian realizes that perfection in this lifetime is only attainable by way of self-denial nourished by loving contemplation of God.

The move from the regular external triangular mimetic desire to the “metaphysical” desire of the model’s/ (internal) mediator's/ obstacle’s being, and to the desire of the innermost model/ mediator (and only when untrue to form can this model be felt as an obstacle),  actually signifies or is paralleled by a gradual transformation, then a collapse of the mimetic triangle.

Especially when the mimetic relationship resembles a tug of war this transformation consists in that one of the vertices – that of the object of desire – is replaced by a mental/spiritual construct of love of self, or, love with one’s self, real or only perceived as such in the model by the (permanently or temporarily) weaker party. But if the protagonist – in dire need of reasserting himself when being spurned, humiliated or neglected by his very model/obstacle – is able to hold his ground, and fall back on his own narcissistic self-love to now propagate himself as an ostensibly lovable object of desire, first in his own eyes, then, hopefully, in the eyes of his (all of a sudden erstwhile) model/ obstacle, we might yet be witnessing a veritable mimetic dance. All that is fueled by vanity, or rather self-love manifesting itself as vanity, if not becoming vanity or vainglory itself.

Incidentally, the mimetic triangle never becomes a true quadrangle, thus testifying to the precariousness of narcissistic self-love: even in a relationship marked by an internal mediation that turns into a tug of war, the two phantoms of self-love will not coexist. When one is gaining the upper hand, the other is being depleted: sapped of its energy and bled dry by the one in the ascendant, its “owner” wallowing in despair – until the tide turns. 

The virtual collapse of the mimetic triangle can only happen if and when the innermost model is felt as legitimately demanding renunciation of either one’s being (cf. Buddhism, which actually holds that there is no self as such, following on its fundamental tenet of impermanence of everything), or of one’s self-love (mystical Christianity; but with no self-love and the collapse of the triangle also the very self of the mystic disappears, and the mystic falls back on Christ the source of his/her being and fount of his/her love – nothing but Christ in place of self; here spiritual pride or hubris is the main threat to the real disappearance of self-love, self-love manifesting itself as, or actually being hubris).

It is worth reaffirming here that as long as self-love reasserts itself in the mystic, his/her love cannot be or mirror that of Christ’s; it is spurious, a mere lifeless imitation thereof. Such is the unequivocal teaching of virtually all the early Christian writers from the East, as well as many from the West. Some Easterners, being truly Trinitarian in their views on man's union with God, held also that man's Christ-like kenosis can lead him/her to participation in the sharing of love between the Hypostases of the Trinity. Now that would also signify a mystical reemergence of the triangle, this time fully embedded in man's heart and much transformed: the ever dynamic figure letting, upon eradication of self-love, man's desire to be both truly loving as well as truly loved, find unceasing fulfillment. His/her theosis would now be full, manifesting itself as a radiance not unlike that of Jesus on Mount Tabor, as a passing-through of God's love to the world around. 

Among various formulations of man’s spiritual trichotomy – in contradistinction to the psychological dichotomy of body and soul – the Christian East posited the existence of the “spiritual” or rational soul at the pinnacle of man’s soul, there being lower down also the irascible soul and the concupiscent one. As mentioned above, Evagrius Ponticus fleshed out that construction with his proposition of eight logismoi, understood as evil passions, thoughts or even demons, eager to beset the human soul, each of them assigned to one of its three levels. Only pride and vainglory are proper to the spiritual soul, whereas envy – initially operative in mimetic desire – is proper to the irascible soul (Evagrius calls it “sadness” – at fellow men’s possessing or enjoying something, for some also at one's reactions of this sort; Gregory the Great renamed it “envy”). The other logismoi of the irascible soul are anger and acedia (listlessness verging on despair), whereas those of the concupiscent one are gluttony, lust and avarice.  

That delimitation uncannily dovetails with that that one could infer from Girard: the various stages and shades of a man’s quest to have his/her other-created desire met is splendidly characterized by the evil passions of the irascible soul; the two categories might naturally be viewed as the two sides of the same coin. Envy is almost always accompanied by anger or resentment, especially when frustrated, and can eventually turn “acedic.” This type of desire clearly is not appetitive in nature, it requires a mediator, who tends to be internalized while becoming an obstacle. Internal mediation is that type of mimetic mediation of desire that is most characteristic of someone in whom envy is coupled with anger or resentment.
 

Appetites are the domain of the concupiscent soul (sometimes also called “bodily soul”), although each of them can easily devolve into an other-generated desire, where all bounds and propriety are abandoned as the soul  is instigated to desire in excess of what would normally satisfy the respective appetite, or to desire objects not really needed to have it satisfied. The starting point here is what Girard calls external mediation, and at its initial stages desire pivots on an external object in possession of the mediator. 

Now if even those desires that are appetite-based, meaning that they are appetites in the absence of any model/mediator,  and only become mimetic desires – with their characteristic structure and crescendo of intensity – if and when models do appear, it is obvious that in human interactions there is actually no escaping their attendant rivalries, regardless of whether there actually is any scarcity to create or exacerbate them. And they tend to be sinister, easily degenerating into scapegoating and finally even into physical violence.

As the above clearly shows, and bearing in mind that according to Mimetic Theory the only model of desire worth imitating is Jesus Christ, any positive ethic built on it could only be radical: nothing short of a thoroughgoing effort at eliminating the self-love at the root of all the “bad” varieties of mimetic desire would do. And that would certainly have to include being vigilant and honest as to one’s real motivations behind the ostensible pursuit of Christ-the-model, impinging as they must on Christ's innermost mediation of man's metaphysical desire (succumbing to pride and narcissistic vainglory that beset one's spiritual soul preeminent among them).  In short, what would be called for would be an ethic advocating and incarnating the elimination of self-love, manifesting itself in various insidious forms described by Evagrius, an ethic of spiritual discernment and spiritual yet very practical asceticism, pointing to and leading man onto a way of contemplative yearning to become one with the model, to thus fill the vacuum at one’s center left by the emptying of the self of a self-love constituting that very self.

By way of conclusion: drawing on Evagrian thought (bolstered by some Buddhist insights) an attempt has been made to set out the basic ideas for a future expansion of Mimetic Theory into a formulation of “Girardian” ethic.  

In no particular order there follow some of its preliminary yet pivotal tenets:

·         Pursue the way of prayerful contemplation – to be transparent to God’s love, dissolving any barriers to it that also constitute one’s self.

·         Be guided by the metaphor of no-self also on returning to the world; “no-self but love” as one’s operative principle in order to be actuated by God’s love.

·         Spiritually discern the workings of various manifestations of self-love in one’s soul.

·         In light of the above, discern those manifestations within the movements of one’s mimetic desire, in order to defuse mimetic crises and rivalries.

·         Abide by Jesus’ “new commandment” of “loving one another just as I [Christ] have loved you.”

·         Be ready for martyrdom: ready to “lay down one’s life for one’s friends,” including as a latter-day scapegoat, if need be.

·         Abide by the principle of nonviolence; when fighting a particular case of injustice this would entail developing a deliberate strategy.

In modern, largely urban setting such an ethic could be tentatively called “open world ethic of no-self mysticism,” or “no-self mimetic ethic of mysticism in the world,” or “no-self ethic of urban mysticism,” or “mimetic mystical ethic of no-self,” or something along these lines, possibly employing also the Girardian term “interdividual.”

Mysticism as outlined above is in line with the sentiment expressed by some twentieth century Christian thinkers that religion (meaning Christianity) would either be mystical or would disappear altogether. While this might not be so, in a Girardian context and if the analysis above is valid, one is fully entitled to say that man, wildly mimetic and interdividual that he is, humanity as such, and the world could only be saved from apocalypse if man’s moral strivings were carried to their mystical limits, as described above.