From Reciprocal “Bad” Violence to Judicial “Good” Violence – and Beyond…

A protracted civilizational process takes a culture from the stage characterized by crises of reciprocal violence, periodically resolved by unanimous violence, first zeroed in on the original scapegoat (per Rene Girard, that’s when a culture is actually constituted), then on ritualistic scapegoats (the ritual in due course comes to be officiated by the priestly caste), and eventually – but this time not at all uniformly across human societies – on transgressors of societal norms, meted out by a judiciary that somehow had appeared on the scene, thus also separating culture from civilization proper.

Mimetic theory posits that reciprocal violence can only be quelled by unanimous violence. Consequently the judicial system must embody the principle of unanimous violence at least implicitly (if not foster or even enforce it if need be) for it to be effective. Regardless of Girard’s not having addressed the issue explicitly (to my knowledge), that actually is the case – as long as that system remains operative. But that in turn is effected by more violence, if need be, this time directed at those, apart from the transgressors themselves, who might object to its verdicts, in cases of violent crimes most often deeming them as insufficient in severity. (With nonviolent crimes it might be the reverse.) This last type of violence or its threat, of whatever form, obviously is not “unanimous” anymore: not everyone, again disregarding the transgressors but also crime victims protesting against the original verdict, necessarily agrees with it. Still, the civilized man would be expected to lay off having supposedly internalized the sentiment implicit in justicia locuta, causa finita est, itself a paraphrase of a well-known maxim, on which civilized jurisprudence is in fact based.

But there is one more thing that is being gradually lost as this protracted cultural process of societal employment of violence is unfolding, and that is its spontaneity. It might be argued in fact that the gradual loss of true spontaneity is what makes the employment of violence gradually and steadily less and less effective in dissipating it altogether – at least for a while.

Spontaneity does not accord with enforced unanimity, not in the long run at least. It thrives in a climate of, and accords well with, arbitrariness, as in the culture’s foundational, or “sacrificial” (per mimetic theory) crisis. Of course both can be staged to an extent by adroit demagogues. But liberal democracies must not foment or indulge in ostentatious spontaneity in the employ of (enforced) unanimity of its judicial verdicts. If such measures were to be regularly resorted to with a view to underpinning the system, rule of law would have fallen by the wayside, and society would be sitting atop a precarious summit with precipices all around.

And that is precisely when that society would be ripe for a potent dose of truly spontaneous violence. Contemporarily this might easily happen if and when the always fragile balance between liberty, equality and solidarity, arguably liberal democracy’s three underpinning principles, got really out of whack. Now whether the imbalance was felt by the aggrieved as economic or having to do with respect or recognition, would largely be irrelevant. I argue that especially in periods of economic growth it is the latter that takes precedence as the main cause of instability. And out of the three principles in liberal democracies (and by extension in the global village as well) it is the principle of (now outraged) equality that is the most important lever dislodging the equilibrium.

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Before moving to the titular “beyond,” I now adumbrate a step-by-step mimetic approach to the preceding transformation signaled in the title. When I talk about judicial “good” violence, I concern myself specifically with its application in punishing violent crime. It is rather easy to argue then that its apparent use of the principle of proportionality is precisely what makes this “good” violence appear as just in the eyes of the public. I argue additionally that there is yet another principle behind its application, one that also reinforces a sense of justice on the part of the public, viz., that of vicarious reciprocity.

Violent crime lends itself rather easily to a concurrent use of both principles that seem to underpin judicial “good” violence, thus working towards fostering a measure of public unanimity that is needed to dissipate outrage caused by the initial act of violence, especially when the emotion has been powerfully fomented by the media. Though the unanimity is mostly assumed or implied and sometimes achieved only grudgingly, and, moreover, it often eventually becomes less and less real or only apparent, it is in the context of nonviolent crimes that both principles might appear as moot.

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(1) According to mimetic theory hominization got its start in bouts of reciprocal violence: Man is a mimetic creature, his social interactions with others are subject to the dynamics of mimetic desire, which is necessarily reciprocal, and thus tends to lead man into violence. One might say that just as desire constitutes man, so does violence. Moreover, when viewed from within the mimetic horizon, violence is also seen as spontaneous and arbitrary.

But violence engendered through the operation of mimetic desire has always threatened the very survival of human societies, indeed man’s very survival, just as it does today. From that standpoint some forms of violence must be judged as bad. It must follow then that “bad” violence is that which cannot be contained.

(2) How does man contain violence before it becomes uncontainable or “bad”? With “good” violence, such as is able to stop from spreading the violence threatening to engulf the community in an uncheckable conflagration. In order to be effective it must be a decisive brake on reciprocity, and thus must be unanimous. It also remains spontaneous and arbitrary, or rather becomes really such, as now it can also be appreciated even outside a strictly mimetic horizon.

According to Girard the first instances of this “good” violence in society establish it as sacred, and form the basis of a religion, or are what that religion is all about. Religion is born of a sacrificial crisis, where violence inflicted on a random victim is able to (suddenly) contain all other violence – for the time being.

(3) This sacred or “good” violence is in due course enshrined in a ritual consisting in visiting violence on a surrogate victim, and then replicated in expectation of its bestowing the same result, viz., peace, on the community, as the initial sacrifice. Culture is born – based on ritual violence, which still is unanimous, but not arbitrary anymore, as well as less and less spontaneous.

Unfortunately, with passing time the effects of the ritual start to wear off. Does it have to do with its lack of spontaneity?

(4) One way to distinguish “barbarian” societies from the civilized is by ascertaining whether they have evolved a judicial system. It arguably can only happen in hierarchical societies, like feudal ones, as opposed to those of hunter-gatherers. So, when social hierarchies appear, a judicial system may follow, whether religion-based or not.

(5) But the role of the judicial system is exactly the same as that of the sacred violence of religions. It is the embodiment of “good” violence, one at the service of the community. It replaces religion and its rituals in its capacity of containing violence, just as initially the monarchs and feudal lords replace the priestly caste in the dispensing of “good” violence. With its pretensions to impartiality, the “good” violence of the judiciary finally replaces “personal” reciprocity.

If the judicial system’s containment of “bad” violence is not spontaneously “unanimous” anymore, it tends to be relatively much more effective and uniform for long stretches of time. Also, which is of preeminent importance for the mimetic man, it tends to keep the lid on man’s mimetic reciprocity, the very source of violence in man, though all of that might peter out eventually, paving the way for a new “sacrificial” crisis. And, arguably, those societal developments shape and are in turn reflected in man’s sense of justice.

Now, man’s sense of justice or fairness is considered by Jonathan Haidt, author of the book The Righteous Mind. Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, as one of man’s six moral foundations, truly normative as being hardwired into his brain. I argue that it is the most mimetically rivalrous of them all for being by far the most involved in reciprocity. In fact it is all about reciprocity. Being about reciprocity, the mimetic man’s sense of justice is also about violence. The very existence of this sense and especially its role in the operation of the judiciary seem to legitimize violence, though in civilized societies ostensibly only its “good,” allegedly impartial, judicial variety.

So the question is: even as the officially nonreciprocal “good” violence of the judiciary replaces the (“bad”) violence of “personal” reciprocity, how can justice as pronounced in the judiciary’s verdicts succeed in displacing man’s “natural” sense of justice as embodied in personal vengeance? Might it be that the judiciary’s meting out of punishments still feels as (and in fact still is) a species of vengeful reciprocity, though it be “vicarious” reciprocity only, one that, moreover, aims to break the cycle of personal reprisals and eliminate the self-perpetuation of violence? Arguably that is what retributive justice executed on behalf of the state – our brand of justice – is all about.

(6) Just as the evolvement of social hierarchies was a prerequisite for the subsequent appearance of a judiciary, its apparent gradual displacement in the West has arguably contributed to the volatility of a societal sense of justice, to its being easily outraged – if not to a growing sense of injustice. It is especially clearly discernable in periods and areas where the idea of man’s inborn equality is taking hold: as in democracies hierarchies slowly give way to cultures of ostensible equality, equality itself seeks means to really come to the fore.

A concomitant development is that the judiciary’s “good,” viz., ostensibly impartial, nonreciprocal, non-spontaneous, non-arbitrary violence – thus deemed as able to contain its very opposite, “bad” variety – might then be seen as an obstacle. The judiciary might then in fact appear as anything but equitable, as employing violence in the service of upholding a system that is increasingly felt as unjust, based on inequality, even as it is paying lip service to its opposite, if not extoling its virtues.

(7) “The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century,” blares the title of a recent book (Walter Scheidel’s). Violence is always at hand as an equalizer, ready to destroy differences. It may set in a repeat of the whole cycle, beginning again with violent mimetic reciprocity on every hand. A new violence-based equilibrium might in due course be established, a new culture created; the whole cultural process might possibly be repeated.

Now in the past the leveling effect of violence would come about as if of itself, but today it is different. Though it might concern diverse fields of human interaction, be they economic, or having to do with recognition, it is the (ostensible) pursuit of equality that is viscerally felt by those aggrieved across our globe of falling formal hierarchical barriers as the proper contemporary brand of justice. And it has a powerful tool in violence, in fact the most potent of them all in the long run. But in fact it is and has always been so also with justice itself.

(8) Now the idea of equality is a latecomer in man’s societal development, or alternatively it has recently come round after a long hiatus, from times when hunter-gatherer groups would kill strongmen trying to assert their superiority over a society cultivating egalitarian attitudes. Today the underlying sense of fairness or justice manifests markedly different forms than in those earlier times, be they hunter-gatherer or subsequent hierarchical, feudal societies.

Though the moral foundation of fairness or justice is man’s normative, hardwired imperative and indeed part of what constitutes man as man, the very idea of justice has undergone an evolution that has put the modern man in a radically new place in terms of morality. He is steeped in a culture whose accumulated and yet constantly evolving body of moral ideas, including those concerning justice, is bound to collide sooner or later with his “natural” sense of justice. And if ever there is one, a “raw” sense of justice must arguably be based on reciprocity – and thus be a major contributor to societal violence.

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Disclaimer: What I attempt to outline below is not a utilitarian approach to justice, or, alternatively, it goes well beyond it, with its appeals to progressive Christian values and to Christian or Christianity-inspired models, in order to abide by the former and imitate the latter.

(I) Now comes the big question: why is it that the judicial system in managing to successfully contain “bad” violence by breaking cycles of “personal” reciprocity in society, if not nipping them in the bud – with the use of violence, to be sure, but such as is legitimate, “good,” viz., impartial and ostensibly rational, if not also impassive – has not in due course reinvented itself to first propose rooting out violence altogether from the system, or at least its inordinate forms, and then try to inculcate such attitudes in society? And shouldn’t Christianity be expected at least to attempt to break the cycle of all violence: if it concedes to “good” violence as embodied in the judiciary, in the long run it does to the “bad” too, if unwittingly.

Mimetic theory states that all reciprocity has the potential to degenerate into its “bad” variety, and eventually become violent. If the judicial system manages to contain violence nipping in the bud cycles of “personal” reciprocity, the one that really counts for the protagonists in a conflict, why should it retain violence, its seeming natural companion?

One possible answer is that although from the standpoint of the state and society at large the role of the judicial system consists in the containment of violence, the inordinate violence exerted by it in the process of meting out punishments has to do with conceding for it to be a form of vicarious reciprocity. If, as mimetic theory seems to imply, violence visits man only in the context of reciprocity, it would make sense, at least when both (all) protagonists mutually acknowledge their humanity. [Research shows that actual dehumanization of opponents is relatively rare even in human interactions involving incredible cruelty.]

Consequently, rooting out (inordinate) violence from the system would have to be accompanied by no concession being given to reciprocity, however “impartial” and “rational” it might be. [Inordinate violence would be such as exceeds measures necessary for enforcing justice, and maintaining societal safety and security.] But would this not amount to an unbearable violation of man’s sense of justice – and thus in the process also to a wholesale subversion of the judicial and legal systems? Would man’s moral foundation of justice not revolt and in turn subvert such an effort, possibly by violence returning to society with a vengeance?

(II) Proposing that the above considerations are (part of) the reason why Christianity has not been forthcoming to help, if not inspire, an effort to transform the judiciary so that it should aim at rehabilitation while trying to secure a sense of safety and security in society by means going beyond simple crime deterrence, is to posit a thorough understanding on its part of the ramifications of man’s mimetic nature. And yet a religion that in some of its most radical pronouncements not only condemns violence outright, but seems on occasion to strongly deemphasize reciprocity as such, as leading to violence, might be expected to promote such an approach – to eventually replace inordinate, vicarious reciprocity-based violence that today’s judiciary embodies.

So why didn’t Christianity ever truly get to work on shaping man’s sense of justice accordingly? Shaping it as to hopefully entirely replace one day mankind’s position on violence, both good and bad, with radical nonviolence based on forgiveness and aimed at reconciliation? And why did post-Christian states’ legal and judicial systems not engage in analogous work, perhaps focusing on fostering a sense of security in society – and thus dealing directly with violence and its threats? Instead of meting out violence/just punishments why would they not mean their verdicts as remedial measures on one hand aimed at securing society’s safety while on the other providing rehabilitation of the criminals, including through forms of restorative justice if the crime victim agrees?

Such efforts on the part of those two institutions, and perhaps others as well, in due course would arguably go a long way toward reshaping man’s justice or fairness moral foundation as it is actually exercised in society. The fact that in the process it would (have to) forgo relying on violence cannot be overestimated.

Moreover, such a change is entirely conceivable, since at the present stage of human evolution man’s ontogenesis is shaped – as powerfully as it has never been before – by his rapidly changing cultural and technological environment. As a consequence, it is only man’s malleable mind that is capable of rapidly evolving now; or rather it is an emergent complexified global consciousness, where moral sentiments feature prominently, that is taking shape. What might also motivate the forward-looking Christian is the vision that this “noosphere” (Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s term) is ascending toward the Omega Point, the eternal Christ Consciousness, and we should aspire to be a conscious part of that ascent.

(III) Though apparently shared by both the progressives and the conservatives in society, man’s moral foundation of fairness /justice is problematic also from a purely descriptive standpoint because both groupings differ diametrically in their understanding of it. What is one side’s justice many a time is the other side’s injustice. Suffice it to recall here polemics of the advocates of “egalitarian” positions, and those affirming “equal opportunities.” Even Jesus’ position on justice-related issues did not escape being questioned while He lived on earth, or anachronistically criticized by later commentators. Some of the Sermon on the Mount passages are often cited as examples of a seemingly cowardly renunciation of any striving for justice: the famous “do not resist evil,… turn the other check,… let him have the shirt also,… go with him the second mile” themes. Yet, as Walter Wink so convincingly showed in his last books, these words, on the contrary, are a summons to nonviolent resistance to evil, not at all to virtual complicity in it by forgoing resistance. They are a summons to adopt a nonviolent brand of justice.

Such a stance requires actually much more courage and wisdom (as exemplified by the martyr Mahatma Gandhi, or Nelson Mandela upon ascending to power) than reciprocity- and adrenaline-driven rage that seems to be the normal mode of pursuing justice in our time. Jesus unequivocally renounced that, knowing that there is but one small step from that to an evil no lesser than the one that the justice advocate is fighting against. That evil is scapegoating, the violence of its outward forms and/or inherent in the motivation underlying it.

Virtually nobody, including those inspired by Christ’s radical message of “loving one’s enemies, and doing good to those who hate one,” who thus abhor revenge (as having nothing to do with love) as well as discern vengeance behind the functioning of the judicial system, seems to advocate refraining from it all and instead focusing on society’s safety. Nobody seems to even try to effect a shift in public opinion on the issue, thus assuring continuity of the reign of “good” violence/judicial vengeance. And there seems to be an unimpeachable “fairness” logic behind this stance: even those who themselves (would) refrain from indulging in vicarious revenge when violence is directed against them, do not want to force nonviolence on others.

Would man, mimetic as he is, become less human by this paradigmatic shift? On the contrary, his mimetic endowment would probably be more geared toward creativity than it is now, when it is bound to fritter away its energies in violent reciprocity. So is it really too early and too much to say that it is time that the mimetic violence-based sense of justice be done away with, replaced with a sense of care and love? And the judiciary’s role redefined accordingly, its efforts aiming at fostering societal security and safety?

Rene Girard mentioned in at least one of his books (Battling to the End) that he refused early on in his career a proposal on the part of Emmanuel Levinas to engage in discussion. He wasn’t ready at the time. Was he ready later? Ever? Would he – would we – be ready to endorse Levinas’ apparent deemphasizing of even justice concerns while strongly emphasizing responsibility toward the Other, or care about and for one’s fellow human beings? Would we be ready to switch gears to creative mimesis and stop focusing on destructive zero-sum varieties? Would we be ready to truly disengage from violent reciprocity?

(IV) On leaving (preoccupations with) destructive mimesis we will certainly be in unchartered territory. But such is also the nature of any loving and creative activity. And we should be reassured that this new concern of ours would be in line with what the supreme model of loving mimesis – Jesus Christ – would like to see us doing. Plus, we would be returning – but against a wholly new backdrop – to some characteristics of mimesis that make it so powerful a human propensity, such as spontaneity, yet this time lending their magic to things and endeavors of moral value. Could even reciprocity make a welcome comeback in those new circumstances, as fraught with the danger of degenerating into violence as it is?

For one, spontaneity might be now real, as opposed to its shadowy, forced variety within a zero-sum mimetic horizon. And reciprocity? As long as there is a loving humility able to deflate the balloon of narcissistic vanity, pride, envy and the like whenever they threaten to overwhelm us, as a mutual influence it should actually be able to assist us in discerning and creatively navigating any situation as it presents itself.

(V) The work to effect this paradigm shift would not at all be easy or straightforward; it would be long and arduous – if it ever were to succeed. But as the evolvement of a judiciary in (hierarchical) societies was a necessary and successful step in curbing “bad” reciprocal violence prevalent in them, so pernicious that it periodically threatened their very survival, so the proposed shift would hopefully go a long way toward reducing the overall level of societal violence – of whatever variety. It would have to start with the “good,” judicial violence being purged as rationale behind statute books and case law. Since violence is highly contagious, the less it is implied or used rhetorically by the judiciary, the better for the well-being of society and its members.

The Christian should not only welcome this shift but also work toward its advancement. Arguably only with its implementation could the full Gospel message, inclusive of the Sermon on the Mount, be considered as taken on board in earnest. No more need to downplay some of the message as abstruse or even inconsistent with its overall thrust. In fact this development might have the potential to liberate man, to set free the power of his creativity, thus contributing to an abundant world that need not be violent to truly move forward.