Now the question is: do mimetic interdividuals evince definite patterns of behavior when interacting with other people, actuated by their desires as they are? If so, do they remain consistent in various types of interaction? Are some people more prone to rivalry and/or conflict than are others? In what social settings? Does that all depend on motivational patterns that people of different Enneagram types evince? Is there any correlation between those Enneagram types and particular ways of desire-driven interactions and behaviors? (Enneagram literacy is assumed in what follows.)
By way of introduction and to state my initial area of interest in studying possible ways of intersection between mimetic interdividual psychology and the Enneagram I begin with an excerpt from my last year’s blog:
"…in efforts such as Jean-Michel Oughourlian’s enlargement/reformulation of mimetic theory… the mimetic man of Rene Girard… becomes a multihued creature that he actually is, albeit his many shades of psychological makeup seem depicted mostly as breeding grounds for so many psychological disorders, rather than as regular psychological types that can be seen as associated with or evincing different mimetic patterns…
"Yet Oughourlian’s formulation of the concept seems a bit unfortunate, namely when he posits as entirely mimetic one of the three layers of man’s brain, while the two other—the emotional and the rational—seem to be mostly performing the task of filtering and distorting pure mimetic impulses, with mimesis of desire obviously being their chief preoccupation. Yet human mimesis is best seen as functionally enveloping the whole of man, grounded as it seems first and foremost in his empathic capacity. The filtering and distorting should rather be related more broadly to his empathetic impulses, which seem phylogenetically more basic and earlier so as to justify describing them as instinctual (clearly so for unimpaired brains). And so instead of positing a mimetic “brain,” its first layer should rather be seen—much more broadly—as instinctual (inclusive of man’s enteric nervous system, or the gut brain, which supplements the central nervous system that includes the cephalic brain, and is known to produce “gut feelings”). It best be regarded as including parts of man’s empathic endowment but also his dominance drive, as well as his natural, non-mimetic appetites, conforming to his animal brain. Alternatively, the brain’s instinctual layer could be seen as that where the play of human mimesis is at its most basic and natural, whereas at the higher layers it gets more and more complicated and eventually distorted, potentially leading to psychological problems that may be purely functional or characterological, and that may be or may turn pathological."
Now come excerpts from Jean-Michel Oughourlian’s The Mimetic Brain (Studies in Violence, Mimesis, & Culture), beginning with his all-important 3x3 Diagram from page 72, followed by a graph and passages explaining and expanding on some of its content.
“…a nodal point N representing the self’s [false] claim to the ownership of its desire and a nodal point N' representing desire’s [false] claim to anteriority over the other’s desire, which was responsible for inspiring and generating it.”
“Psychoses are characterized by delusion, in other words by a discourse about all or part of reality that is delusional. Classical European psychiatry characterizes delusions by three elements: their mechanism( s), their theme( s), and their structure( s)— the “structure” referring to the fact that they are “systematized” or “nonsystematized” (i.e., they possess— or do not possess— an internal coherence). These three elements obviously fall under the cognitive brain, the neocortex or first brain. …diagnoses of psychoses in classical psychiatry are made solely based on the analysis of discourse, that is to say of the patient’s delusion, which translates or expresses the disorder of his cognitive brain. That is why these psychoses are called “mental illnesses.”
“In [obsessional] neurotics, what seems to be malfunctioning is essentially cognitive in nature: knowing that what one is doing is absurd, but being unable to prevent oneself from doing it. It seems very plausible that all of this unfolds in the first brain, but if the latter misses a step in the ritual, the second [emotional] brain goes into panic mode…
The phobic neurosis, which bears certain traits of the anxiety neurosis and certain others of the hysterical neurosis, can also clearly be placed among the emotional disorders, and ascribed to the second brain.”
“…a mimetic movement in the third [mimetic] brain gradually slips from the model toward the rival and then the obstacle. Desire, too, can gradually slip from the recognition of its inspiration to the claim to its precedence. As for the self, it is rare for it not to be persuaded of being the owner of its desire, but it can claim this ownership with greater or lesser virulence, driving it gradually toward neurosis or psychosis. Mimetic psychopathology will thus be dynamic, evolutionary, and cinematographic, while recognizing that by taking photographs of the process at various moments, those photographs may represent a neurotic or psychotic “structure” corresponding to a diagnosis. All of this must be seen as a traveling shot: everything is linked together, but if one selects film stills, neuroses or psychoses will appear as frozen individualities.”
“…for each patient we explore the situation of points N and N' shared by everyone and which constitute normality if there is no problem, neurosis if the problem arises mainly at N, and psychosis if the problem arises principally at N'.”
Comments:
One crucial clarification regarding the Diagram: J-MO mixes planes when with regard to his “normal structure” he says that the model seen as an obstacle may only lead one to renounce his/her desire, whereas the model seen as a rival (as distinct from obstacle, or not having yet become one) may elicit a vengeful reaction, in addition to envy and/or jealousy (all of that is reflected in his Diagram). But then he says that the former situation in fact obtains in hierarchical settings that are not challenged, and that qualification is important in my opinion. Arguably in our egalitarian times vengeance would have to be moved to the “obstacle” column within the “normal structure” row. With this move this intersection is revealed as the proper locus of Enneagram Type 8.
The third brain is posited by J-MO to be mimetic, as opposed to the first or rational brain, and the second or emotional brain. It is regarded as responsible for man’s “normal” mimetic functioning. The two other “brains” are seen as the loci of potential mimetically instigated disorders.
Of course the Enneagram posits the existence of three “centers of intelligence,” as some literature calls them, or base human motivations: the rational (head), the emotional (heart), and the instinctual (gut, body). There is an uncanny similarity of structure (3x3) and even of (at least some) language (“rational,” “emotional”), if not general outlook, between what J-MO posits and the Enneagram.
When collating the two approaches what immediately becomes clear is that superimposing the two structures – the interdividual or mimetic, and the Enneagramic – would require equating or overlaying the instinctual triad or center with the mimetic “brain.” To do so certainly does not seem counterintuitive.
The 3x3 structure evident in both approaches may lead one to actually beg the question. That’s a real danger, especially that the next step as I see it would have to be to see whether there is a fit between J-MO’s 3x3 Diagram and particular Enneagram types, with each J-MO’s row populated by types belonging to one (and only one) of the Enneagram’s centers.
In other words, the subject of an initial inquiry might be whether particular “average health” Enneagram types would normally or most often gravitate into J-MO’s respective “model,” “rival” or “obstacle” positions – from their respective Enneagram centers, or whether there is no such discernable pattern. (The “gut/body” types would populate J-MO’s “normal” row, the “heart” types the “neurotic” row, and the “head” types the “ psychotic one.) Of course in the proposed approach any pathology connotation would be avoided, at least initially, as we’re talking about an average person’s propensity to either normally seek or settle for a “model” or external mediation type of relation, or being mostly rivalrous in their relations, or, finally, being domineering and/or combative to the point of either clearing the “obstacle” away or themselves backing down, possibly to contemplate revenge. All of that across their regular spectrum of human interactions, possibly with their peers to begin with, but including politics and the political arena as well (that is of real interest for me).
But there’s much more to be taken account of, e.g., types’ lines of integration and disintegration, wings and instinctual subtypes. And then there are Enneagram Tritypes and Archetypes (a theory developed by Katherine Fauvre), of particular interest to the present inquiry, as they might be extremely relevant with regard to MT. In fact any attempt at ascribing Enneagram types to “model,” “rival,” and “obstacle” columns would by default correspond to sets of 3 particular Enneagram Archetypes. These are Tritypes (each Tritype represents a combination of Enneagram types from all the three centers of intelligence), 27 in total, where there’s no stacking of types on the basis of their hierarchy within a given Tritype. When attempting to fit them into J-MO’s Diagram a mimetic theory-based stacking is done automatically anyway.
Out of the 27 Fauvre’s Archetypes Enneagram literature seems to favor 3 groups of 3 types, or a total of 9 types (though obviously they are not seen as three types combined to form one Archetype). Those Tritype equivalents are considered to show discernable common patterns as manifested through the three centers of intelligence. Now according to Fauvre (and apparently Oscar Ichazo before her) as every person does have access to all three centers, although with varying ease and intensity, Enneagram Tritypes and, more broadly, Archetypes, are valid and meaningful concepts capable of assisting people on their journey of self-discovery and transformation. (Especially so when their stacking order is ascertained and taken into account to show a Tritype.)
Now any ascription would have to begin with J-MO’s “normal” row, equivalent to the Enneagram gut or body triad. Here ascription seems rather straightforward if not self-evident (though of course it’s also up for discussion): the “model” position goes to type 9, the “rival” to type 1, and the “obstacle” to type 8.
The 3 groups are: 1) the Harmony (Daniels’ terminology), or Object Relations triads, alleged to reflect long term or deep life motivations and ways of relating to the world, common to each triad, 2) a group of modified (by Riso & Hurley/Dobson) Hornevian triads (Karen Horney’s theories of neurosis and personality formation must be credited with much influence on Enneagram researchers), also called the Social Styles triads, alleged to reflect common to each triad short term or surface motivations that influence peoples’ problem solving strategies or how they deal with life’s regular daily challenges, and 3) the Harmonic (Riso/Hudson), Emotional Regulation (Daniels), or Coping Styles triads allegedly reflecting common to each triad ways of conflict resolution, adversity handling and dealing with situations of unmet, denied or frustrated needs.
Trying to fit those 3 groups of 3 “standardized” Archetypes (consisting of types showing equivalent motivation patterns across the 3 Intelligence Centers in comparable or equivalent life settings) into J-MO’s Diagram one may come up with diagrams arranged as follows (numbers below refer to Enneagram personality types):
Behind those groupings there’s the assumption that the less an Enneagram triad seems conflictual (e.g., by withdrawing from such situations or showing a positive outlook to conflict resolution) in their interactions, the more it seems to fit, or at least resemble, the “model” position of mimetic theory (which is considered to coincide with that of external mediation of desire, or, for the Christian, possibly even Christ’s innermost mediation); those triads that show “toward” and “competent” attitudes in human interactions are considered as the best (though possibly unwitting) candidates for the “rival” position, whereas those expressive, reactive, assertive or aggressive would fit the “obstacle” position (both coincidental with internal mediation of desire). All that in the three different general life settings as reflected by the above three triad groupings – that arguably also correspond to different desire formation/modeling situations.
In conclusion:
1) Since each of the 3 groups relates to different life settings and situations, they as a whole may be seen as at least a partial response to possible Enneagram researchers’ reservations that all people may actually engage in any kind of behavior but they would do so for many different reasons, corresponding to their basic inner motivations. And there’s even more precision for discerning investigators and self-searchers in this approach since there’s another 18 triads, or Enneagram Archetypes. Additional real-life nuancing comes from various stacking orders within each Archetype, for a total 162 Tritypes. Then, as mentioned, there are wings, instinctual subtypes, lines of integration and disintegration. (On the downside there’s the danger of not only clarity being easily lost in such a maze, but the whole enterprise possibly becoming questionable as verging on the meaningless.)
2) The Enneagram is a dynamic personality typology (there are posited, e.g., levels of health), and as such it is considered by many a viable tool for personal and spiritual growth. Now if the theory is to be a meaningful guide on the spiritual journey habitual behavioral patterns, consistent as they most often are with Enneagram type motivational ones in comparable life situations, are thus additionally expected to be at least partly modifiable. Moreover, discernment grounded in the theory may be enhanced by collating its findings and teaching with those of one’s spiritual tradition. For example, Christian ascetic and mystic Evagrius Ponticus’ eight logismoi (or evil passions; the basis of the later seven deadly sins) correspond to Enneagram types’ root attachments or vices. They also may be seen as capable of shedding light on man’s mimetic behavior, thus forming a bridge between MT and the Enneagram. (Here’s a link to my blogpost on the subject: Some Evagrian Insights for a Girardian Ethic)
3) As a tool for personal growth and spiritual transformation, the Enneagram manifests dynamic dialectical patterns. Bringing mimetic theory, another system with clear dialectical overtones (whether acknowledged or not), to bear on Enneagram exploration serves to underscore it even more strongly. Consequently, I think that an additional area to be brought into interplay and discussed might be the work of Cynthia Bourgeault as expressed in her book The Holy Trinity and the Law of Three: Discovering the Radical Truth at the Heart of Christianity. This would certainly deepen our discussion considerably.
