For one, though some call it a “populism from below” that transcends class differences, their protests seem instead to be a reflection of broad economic class divisions, and are mostly able to avoid being embroiled in political distractions nonessential to this perspective: having succeeded in terms of the immediate cause of their movement – Macron scrapping the fuel-tax hike – they demand now a repeal of some other taxes, higher pensions, an increase in the minimum wage, THE RESTORATION OF A WEALTH TAX, AND A LAW FIXING A MAXIMUM SALARY.
Of course societal classes being what they currently are, given the effects of the dominant neoliberal paradigm, are nowhere near as neatly divided around vital issues into class-blind groupings, in many countries into two deeply polarized halves, that manipulations of political demagogues working that paradigm to their advantage would have the populace believe. Consequently, the Yellow Vests so far have rejected any political affiliation, disregarding attempts on the part of opposition political parties, both left and right, inescapably emanating from within the system as they do, to show their support for the movement, while demanding instead a paramount role in politics for referendums, as well as that Macron resign and the National Assembly be replaced with a “People’s Assembly.”
In what way a return of grassroots class-oriented politics might signify a new quality? Certainly that would not mean a lessening of the political polarization in the West, not in an era of social media dominance, when highly-charged developments can spread like wildfire: if it were not for Facebook the leaderless Yellow Vests would not have become a nationwide movement that quickly, if at all. So if one acknowledges deepening societal polarization as one of the biggest problems besetting Western society, how might this development be welcomed as a sign of change? Well, on account of its having a potential to redefine the dividing lines in a context of radical political change, and consequently to reverse this trend in a climate of social solidarity, if only for some time.
To see that potential of unabashed populist class politics one has to realize that presently, on top of mutually and instantaneously reciprocating anger and resentment, the ever more polarized societal moieties resemble one another also in that they both are similarly socially stratified: both right-wing populists and liberal “centrists” have their share of the poor and the wealthy, just as their ancient predecessors before them. It is fair to say that the poor and lower middle classes have been neutralized by society’s reigning oligarchy, who time and again have resorted to coopting their elected representatives into politics as usual or to foisting demagogues on them to further its causes, using smoke and mirrors to show that the existing political divisions are natural and that they reflect those over issues of vital importance to all in society. But obviously that is not the case, and a return of class politics might throw it into sharp relief.
If it were not for this ability to coopt and obfuscate the picture, “the people”, i.e. the poor and lower middle classes, a majority in most Western states and increasingly so, would not demand just lower taxes for themselves (any populist might grant them that; in fact that is what Macron claims to have done in advance of the gasoline tax hike, namely compensating for it by cuts in payroll taxes), but also TAX INCREASES FOR THE WEALTHY, for the state to be able to pay for the essential good quality public services, just as the Yellow Vests are now doing (again: a neoliberal Macron rolled back the so-called solidarity tax on wealth, first introduced back in the 1980s).
And how to avoid the danger of cooptation? Again one such way is by following what the Yellow Vests are doing: staying as a leaderless movement, not electing any official representatives, at least as long as a “People’s Assembly” they are calling for is not convened, and generally keeping at arms’ length any political suitors that (might) appear. (Cf. French philosopher Jacques Rancière, who has long denounced representative democracy, as incapable of producing a genuine democracy, interviewed before the 2017 French election: “The solution is to fight against the system that produces the likes of Marine Le Pen, not to believe that you will save democracy by voting for the first-placed corrupt politician. I still remember the slogan from 2002, ‘Vote for the crook, not the fascist’ [in the second round pitting Jacques Chirac against Jean-Marie Le Pen]. Choosing the crook to avoid the fascist is to deserve both of them. And to prepare the way to having both.”)
In those circumstances if they were to succeed it would only be on a powerful wave of popular support, one that might give them enough steam to carry on politically for quite some time while enjoying considerable majorities – long unseen in polarized Western democratic societies. If they did not manage to succeed, fizzling out just as the Occupy movement has, they at least would not have contributed to an entrenched polarized politics as usual of the West, not on a sustained basis.
So those political commentators announcing that the Yellow Vets’ protests signify a new quality in Western politics might be onto something. Our dysfunctional societal moieties, with their leaders always talking about “the people”, the real people they claim to represent, are not worth defending, and possibly beyond repair from within the system anyway. Rancière: “Today the ‘real people’ is a figure forged by the system itself. We get to a point where we no longer know who will take the different roles: nowadays, a billionaire can represent the people spat upon by the billionaires.” A perfect description of the West’s smoke and mirrors-produced “classless” moiety-based societies, led by demagogues who invariably deceitfully claim to be “against the system.” This is the very configuration that the French Yellow Vests are fighting against from outside that ressentiment-charged scandal-driven system.
To see this movement from a slightly different perspective one might turn to the work of the late Ernesto Laclau, a leftist-populist politics theorist. Some students of his thought are now thinking how to exploit the potential they see in the “empty signifier” (in their Lacanian lingo) that the yellow vest as a symbol is or rather might become if and when the movement fails, which they see as a distinct possibility, at least as long as the movement stays leaderless (contra Rancière). In line with that theory they see a growing need to advance a more consistent political narrative, to forestall a threat of appropriation of some “floating signifiers” associated with the movement, especially by a populist right-wing (as has already been attempted e.g. in Great Britain, with yellow vests donned by far-right Brexiteers resorting to intimidation tactics against “Remoaners”), with a concomitant threat of cooptation of at least a part of the movement, which might result in realigning the remaining fragments possibly along the existing moieties’ lines. Preventing that, as proposed by this progressive-leftist theory, would require turning to outright political action, complete with a charismatic leader. Only then would a protest movement stand a chance of shifting the political balance and the axis dividing society to one broadly based on economic class, which would be anything but a moiety-like division we see currently prevailing, with oligarchs or their proxies busy working their deceit on both sides; in fact on both sides of any artificial division in society. Or so a leftist vision would have it.
xxx
Though Rene Girard referred to societal moieties only on a few occasions, and in contexts much different from those of our postmodern reality, it bears repeating that he in effect acknowledged the double nature of those primitive moieties, namely their tendency to (potentially) foster both differentiation as well as undifferentiation stemming from explicit, potentially conflictual reciprocity (their dangerous twin-like character), though he seems to have seen them preeminently as structured and governed by ritual, thus tending toward societal peace despite being precariously poised. But it is different today, Western societies are now seemingly on a downward spiral, descending into conflictual emotional or expressivist undifferentiation, democratic rituals more and more ineffective, the system’s checks and balances ever more threatened, an equilibrium effected ever more unstable: our postmodern moieties are a far cry from their ancient and primitive predecessors.
Students of mimetic theory would benefit from combining their perspective with those described above, class-oriented as they are, and consequently might see the discussed developments as essentially the breaking of a fraught twin-like deadlock configuration, as a needed and valid societal re-differentiation, and as a return of at least a modicum of meaningful pluralism into the bloodstream of Western liberal democracy. It is doubtful, however, that this would result in a lessening of societal tensions and resentments: even if that was an explicit goal, triumphing egalitarian attitudes most probably would not further it, not in the long run, given their dynamic as predicted by mimetic theory. But that is another story altogether.
No comments:
Post a Comment