Mimetic
theory’s insistence on seeing man as a creature lacking autonomy and free will,
as well as being basically a prey to his mimetically determined desires, has
important implications for its analyses of the contemporary political arena. It
results in a one-sidedness where the dynamics of mimetic desire therein are
analyzed almost exclusively from the standpoint of a mob participant, or with a
narrow focus on the mob as such. Political leadership barely enters the
picture. There seems to be no scope given to political demagoguery, relying as
it does on one-directional hypnotic suggestion on the part of the demagogue
vis-à-vis his followers, and arguably amenable to analysis as a species of
reverse external mediation of desire; nor has it been given to loving mimesis, potentially
capable of introducing a new benevolent dynamic into politics, albeit on a
smaller scale and more slowly than demagoguery – being as it is an intimate “conferral
of imitation,” and amenable to analysis as a species of reverse internal
mediation of desire. Yet, as Spain’s Mondragón shows, when a spirit of loving mimesis has been able to flourish
in the public arena its accomplishments have clearly been encouraging if not
inspirational.
From a
Girardian perspective, however, where every human motivation and action has
precedence in mimetic desire, both the political demagogue and the loving
mimeticist need also to be seen with a view to particular mechanisms of mimetic
desire that actuate them. In broad strokes – since that is not the main subject
of the present essay – the demagogue seems to be actuated first and foremost by
way of internal mediation of his political rivals’ desires, perceived as
envious and ressentiment-filled, as they play out in the public arena (while
his followers largely by that of his rivals’ followers), on top of more than
just a kick-starter of external mediation of some “worthy” exemplars of
political demagoguery, be they contemporary foreigners or historical figures; whereas
the loving mimeticist is actuated by way of external mediation of a benevolent
model’s perceived or imagined desires and motivation as reflected in his/her
actions, preserved sayings and other written records.
Demagoguery in Contemporary
Democracy
The present
essay attempts to see the mimetic triangle as introduced and elaborated by Rene
Girard first and foremost as being about relative power in relationships, about
dynamic distribution thereof. Being a commonplace in the political arena, the mimetic
triangle is predominately about gaining or maintaining power on a mass scale using
its dynamics. And when a demagogue enters the political scene, sooner rather
than later, if not from the very beginning, it is exclusively about power,
about cornering power therein. Demagogues are naturals at exploiting mimetic
power dynamics to their advantage. Plus, if mimetic theory has any clue, their
armamentarium is vastly superior to that of a benevolent leader, especially one
inspired by Christianity: unlike the latter they can fall back on and exploit
to their advantage the scapegoat mechanism. In fact, one doesn’t have to be
mimetic theory-literate to appreciate its potential in political struggle. Recent
neuroscientific research suggests that dominant people’s brains entrain those
of submissive people as they synchronize while interacting. It follows that a
masterly demagogue might be able to effect that via social or mass media.
But what
about benevolent political leaders? And what about nonviolence and concomitant
practices such as renunciation and self-sacrifice, to which mimetic theory seems
in fact to pay lip service only, especially in the political arena? Is it conscionable
to demand them of those who fight demagoguery or perhaps tyranny? The answer
must be twofold: while indispensable in a benevolent leader himself, enjoining them
on the powerless, the hapless and downtrodden who follow him may rightly seem
indefensible in view of the dynamics involved. Renunciation and self-sacrifice
may only be introduced exceedingly judiciously even by a benevolent leader. As
a matter of principle, they must not be enjoined on anybody, but especially not
on the powerless. In the political arena their only conscionable use or
appearance would be in the context of learning them mimetically from leaders
practicing them, leaders who, by virtue of their position, have some relative
power – if they actually practice them themselves. Needless to say such
opportunities would be extremely rare.
It is also
only in such a configuration that renunciation and self-sacrifice could enter
the picture of loving mimesis, which otherwise is about empowerment through loving
fostering of the imitator’s subjectivity and creativity. In this particular
context it is easy to see that even with this limited scope of application they
remain a double-edged or at least ambiguous tool, potentially liable to misuse.
Of course their influence may also be of a slightly different nature, with
examples of such nonviolent leaders as Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. serving
as sources of general inspiration rather than of literal imitation on the part
of the disempowered (or, in terms of mimetic theory, of external mediation, as
opposed to loving mimesis’ internal mediation), yet still enabling the latter
to occasionally correct course in mid-action.
In
parentheses it may be added that mimetic theory’s seminal early insight, viz., that
the term “scapegoating” could only be applied in the context of that theory to situations
where the scapegoat is innocent of the transgressions s/he is accused of
committing, a notion to which its students are led to believe by way of
Girard’s main examples thereof, viz., Jesus and Oedipus (the latter’s alleged
guilt admittedly being unwitting), must be maintained for the sake its
integrity. There is however a tendency afoot in the mimetic theory community,
strongly mimetic itself, that tends to overpower opponents into accepting that,
for all practical purposes, any strong criticism is actually tantamount to
scapegoating, or at least may lead to it, regardless of whether there is any actual
guilt involved on the part of the putative scapegoat, arguably as it seemingly has
the effect of creating an emotionally charged unanimity among accusers directed
against the criticized/”scapegoated.” Yet on top of being counterintuitive, and
also patently untrue to Girard’s seminal early insights, this interpretation tends to obscure or even disregard the
power equation of the situation in question. It leads to such phenomena in
the muddy waters of today’s politics as the notion of the (considered as unacceptable)
“scapegoating of the scapegoater” being used by the mimetically literate to
perversely defend a scapegoater holding a significant part of a politically polarized
society in mimetic thrall by way of the very scapegoating he is accused of in
the first place. And I am not talking here about someone whose power, in a
world beholden to emotional empathy, derives solely from his victimhood
claims.
xxx
Meanwhile contemporary liberal
democracy arguably increasingly ceases to be “liberal,” unless that designation
is limited to signify just one, currently predominant, neoliberal variety. But in
caring only to safeguard at all costs what neoliberalism stands for first and
foremost, i.e., a global (ostensibly) free market, contemporary liberal
democracy tends to produce an inequality that must be glossed over by political
demagogues foisting themselves on top of an electorate divided on whatever
basis that would work for them – other than wealth and true privilege. Then
from their vantage positions at the top they would have one part of the under-
or less-privileged set upon the other, with them leading the fray on both
sides. In the process liberal democracy also tends to shed its plurality, apparently hardly
caring any more about many of its recent constitutive elements, such as mutual respect and
tolerance as shared values that underlie any conception of the common good
therein. It is reflected in and/or
driven by a gradual diminishment of the intended role of its institutional
checks and balances, or worse yet, their blatant enlistment in partisan
politics. Without their sufficient countervailing influence liberal democracy
tends to devolve into “pure” democracy, such as greatest philosophers, starting
with Plato, were sternly warning against. Given the current starting point of
that process – the greatest centralization of state power that history has ever
known, concurrent globalization processes as a backdrop notwithstanding – demagogues
that this devolution tends to produce at an ever faster rate are given
opportunities to get hold of more power than ever has been possible to date.
Naturally they use it to undermine the remaining bases of plurality in society,
or do away with them altogether. Also, their squashing or abusing of systems of
checks and balances in the name of “people” democracy goes hand in hand with an
ever increasing centralization of the state, a process that will not be
completed until they are in a position to do away with the democracy itself.
What
currently thwarts their efforts and gives them pause is a phenomenon that canonical
mimetic theory seems unable to explain if not is totally oblivious to, viz., an
ever deepening polarization splitting society almost exactly in half on any
issue of consequence – instead of polarizing it against a single person or group,
i.e., a scapegoat, in an unwitting push to obtain societal peace at its
expense. It can perhaps be explained, however, in terms of pure power dynamics:
in place of liberal democracy’s ever weakening systems of checks and balances
and the concomitant lack of public trust what seems to be maintaining a semblance
of societal peace is a power equilibrium, inherently unstable though it is, that
is holding for the time being, an equilibrium resulting from an almost equal
power apparently mustered by both inimical sides – their relative powers
determined by their almost equal sizes, both sides’ constant reconstituting
notwithstanding. In fact if and when the precarious balance is tipped to the
advantage of a demagogue-led illiberal movement liberal democracy’s days will
be numbered – as currently seems to be the case with Hungary.
xxx
Now the political demagogue’s malevolent
actions should best be seen as deliberate manipulations, especially his use of
scapegoating of whole populations – his main tool, even if much of his dealings
in the public arena with his counterparts, i.e., demagogues on the other end of
the political spectrum, may be in the mold of internal mediation of desire, and
thus mostly unwitting. How then can mimetic theory, a theory that focuses
chiefly on the randomness of scapegoating and imitation, that analyzes the
mimetic process predominantly from the standpoint of the passive or unwitting
imitator lacking personal autonomy, be of any help when scrutinizing demagoguery
and its appeal? Well, there is a body of work by Jean-Michel Oughourlian that contains
valuable insights concerning the role of hypnotic suggestion in mimesis as seen
within the context of mimetic theory. They may be able to shed light on the processes
inherent in the malevolent use of hypnotic suggestion and hypnotic induction in
a mimetic power relationship when one of its sides deliberately sets out to
influence the other. In order to appreciate their unfolding in the political
arena one would do well to glean and combine relevant insights especially from his
two books, Psychopolitics and The Mimetic Brain.
In short: political demagogues
are adept at introducing power into public mimetic relationships – in order to
manipulate them. Instead of being about the unwitting imitation of a model
(external mimesis) or rival (internal mimesis; which, however, can also be the
basis of loving mimesis, to be discussed further on) on the part of the
imitator acting in the political arena, mimesis then reverses direction and
becomes one about suggestion first and foremost (although the manipulator also feeds
on his followers’ adulation that he has managed to generate in the first place),
a suggestion foisted on “a crowd with only two members” (Freud) who in that
arena multiply into a malleable mass. In the contemporary West its members either
resist him as rival (the case of those who oppose the demagogue for reasons
often scarcely recognized or acknowledged, yet somehow reflective – though
often seemingly randomly – of their various personal narratives and social
circumstances; very few of his opponents are able to simply reject or dismiss him
– and then be mostly indifferent to him – rather than resisting him in a
mimetic fashion, as their antimodel, whether or not having first recognized
their desires’ alterity – antithetical as it is to his – and him as their locus,
and staying adversatively involved with him); or imitate him as model (his followers).“[W]hat
leads to the abandonment of freedom and to dependency is the ‘need for
direction,’ that is to say the path of least resistance for mimetic desire,
which delegates the choice not of a single object but of all its objects to a
single, absolute model,” says Oughourlian with regard to model imitation from
the perspective of the follower. Based on an initial single-issue attraction, she
or he then is led to follow unreflectively the demagogue’s whole agenda, while
his opponents do the same in reverse: repulsed perhaps by his (demagogical in
their eyes) stance on a single issue of importance to them, the dynamic leads
them not so much to simply reject his whole agenda as to resist it in a mimetic
fashion – for the duration, until in fact their resentment is trumped by that
toward another, suddenly more worthy subject. If unchecked somehow, the process
as envisioned here tends to be self-feeding and evidently ever more polarizing.
Additionally, it is easy to see from the above (and the likes of James Madison
and Edmund Burke saw it clearly) that the so called mob rule never is what it
is purported to be: its agenda is manipulatively foisted on them by a ruthless
demagogue rather than somehow decided in a “purely” democratic process. It is
he rather than the mob by themselves that insinuates into the process the
scapegoat mechanism, in order to solidify their nascent uniformity and support
for him.
xxx
In the face
of political power apparently being accumulated and distributed via constantly
reconfigured mimetic triangles that tend to encompass ever widening circles of
people – what actually can be done? How to counteract the inordinate
accumulation of power by unscrupulous political demagogues who consciously or
unwittingly use or instinctively fall back on every trick imaginable from the armamentarium
of mimetic theory to create and hold mimetic mobs in their thrall? It is a hard
goal to accomplish, not least because it would be very difficult to effect a
socially and psychologically acceptable equilibrium in a situation marked by such
strong mimetic dynamics.
Yet, as the present essay
endeavors to show, every step of the process of the current devolution of
liberal democracy described above can be elucidated with the help of mimetic
theory (some of it perhaps uncanonical), something that has hardly been done in
any systematic way so far, as well as measures proposed that might be used in
attempts to thwart its sinister unfolding. Arguably, certainly so for the
present writer, the theory's most needful use would be elucidation of anything having to
do with the rise to power of demagogues in a contemporary liberal democracy
that undergoes such convulsions. Moreover, there is a possibility to elaborate
a positive scenario here, viz., that of fostering the emergence of benevolent
leaders, such as would be ready for self-sacrifice themselves. The latter
characteristic is the only element of this whole process tangentially touched
upon by Girard – when on occasion he would mention, almost in passing, the need
to imitate Jesus or those who imitate him.
What at a
minimum needs to be done is to field or support political leaders who would
embrace an agenda prominently featuring fostering a climate of societal
tolerance (while, on the downside, curbing hate speech in social media) and
trust, as well as promoting political and social pluralism and diversity (including in the field of economic activity, as will be shown further on via
an example of such an endeavor). But in view of the theory’s focus on the dangerous dynamics of internal
mediation inherent in excessive societal uniformity mimetic theory could also be
put to use to shed light on changes to the institutional shape of liberal
democracy that need to be implemented to prevent giving free rein to demagogues
in those circumstances (though the theory’s concentration, limited and reactionary,
is on dangers having to do with abolishing social hierarchies): polarizing
mimetic dynamics attendant upon the workings of demagogues would have to be seen for what they are and effectively
circumscribed in scope as well as sapped of as much of its harmful energy as
possible. To effect a societal reconfiguration that would successfully embody
those insights, adopted measures would arguably have to include institutionalizing and
safeguarding a decentralization of the state that would make extensive use of
the principle of subsidiarity; possibly employing a principle
of supermajority in referendums ratifying major or radical changes, such as constitutional
reforms or gaining national independence; as well as introducing
greater reliance on a participatory democracy that would be
guided by a consensus-seeking spirit, especially at the local level, with a
view to promoting egalitarian communitarianism and cooperation based on
people’s affinities of interests and values. Though such
considerations are well beyond the present essay’s purview, read on to learn
about an on-the-ground example of an apparently successful embodiment of many
of these characteristics, seeded, as it were, by a spirit of loving mimesis.
Scope for Loving
Mimesis in the Social and Political Arena: Preliminary Thoughts
Political demagoguery aside, mimetic
theory is in general conspicuously silent on the issue of political leadership
in the contemporary world, and rather reticent on the subject of modern political
systems that would be compatible both with its worldview and its insights. The most facile response to the
question why no benevolent political leader of stature openly taking her/his
cue from mimetic theory seems to have appeared to date is that no such
proposition has ever been investigated by Rene Girard, nor – to my knowledge –
by any of his followers. (I dismiss at this point hopes placed in Peter Thiel on
accounts of his efforts, both theoretical and practical, as he does not seem to
meet the basic requirement of directing himself toward a political goal that
would be aiming first and foremost at furthering the good of society at large (or
benefitting one’s immediate community, for somebody guided by loving mimesis) –
instead of furthering first of all the interests of his own enterprises.)
Moreover, mimetic theory, admittedly true to its spirit, continues to be
dominated by analysis of a reverse perspective, that of a mob participant, and
by the dynamics she/he is subjected to in that capacity, if not of the mob as
such. Yet
it is worth inquiring into the subject as informed by those insights: scrutinizing
leaders through the mimetic lens, as well as choosing them on that basis.
Let us start with an early Hegel’s (1795, The Positivity of the Christian Religion) characterization and comparison of the leadership
styles of Socrates and Jesus, and their distinctively different appeal for their
respective, again quite different, disciples. Hegel points out that those two
issues are closely intertwined: “The disciples of Jesus… had no political interest like that which a
citizen of a free republic takes in his native land; their whole interest was confined
to the person of Jesus… they had found the basis of their conviction about the teaching of
Jesus principally in their friendship with him and dependence on him. They had
not attained truth and freedom by their own exertions,” whereas, “From
their youth up, the friends of Socrates had developed their powers in many
directions. They had absorbed that democratic spirit which gives an individual
a greater measure of independence and makes it impossible… to depend wholly and
absolutely on one person… They loved Socrates because of his virtue and his
philosophy, not virtue and his philosophy because of him.”
Though both
Jesus and Socrates are benevolent leaders, Hegel’s characterization of their
respective leadership styles highlights what in terms of mimetic theory may be
described, in the case of Jesus, as basically an external mediation of desire
in a hierarchical society (but whose mold he is trying to break), whereas in
that of Socrates as a loving internal mediation of desire that has a democratic polis as a backdrop. Both Socrates and Jesus led their disciples on a quest for truth,
but unlike Socrates Jesus never asked his disciples to challenge his teaching
rather than following it implicitly: ("Follow my advice: think little of
Socrates, and much more of the truth, and if you think what I say is true, then
agree, but if not, oppose me with every argument you can," says Socrates
in Phaedo; Jesus would certainly
never utter analogous words.) Their different leadership brands also seem skillfully
tailored for their followers in terms of their
respective mimetic appeal – again, one
apparently relying on internal mediation of desire operating in a circle of
acknowledged equals (Hegel: “many of them founded schools of their own,
in their own right they were men as great as Socrates”),
while the other on external mediation in a circle of devoted disciples acknowledging
hierarchy even in friendship, at least as far as Hegel’s (perhaps exaggerated) characterization
goes.
They
have one thing in common, however: their apparent willingness to suffer the
ultimate consequence of their teaching, viz., the self-sacrifice of an untimely
death. This corresponds to their refrainment from using force against their
persecutors, thus setting an example for their followers – and for us all
across the intervening millennia. In the case of Jesus it is further amplified
by laying the explicit injunction, whereas in the case of Socrates it is more
of an intimation implicit in his words and composed demeanor during his last
hours.
Yet today this
might not be enough. A benevolent as well as history-
and mimetically-literate leader should know that in order to foster nonviolence
what he must not do is engage in or promote any type of activity or corporate
spirit that may be conducive to an excessive contagious emotional unanimity of
his followers, especially if their numbers grow rapidly. In a polarized contemporary
world that is so vulnerable to political demagoguery that would normally only
amount to deepening or aggravating the existing polarization. Also the
alternative – explicitly setting out to accomplish a much more difficult feat
of bridging the polarization gap – would be fraught, regardless of any good
intentions, with dangers that mimetic theory so aptly warns against: a more
comprehensive national unity could only be effected via triggering the scapegoat
mechanism. No “national unity” of this, or any other, sort is likely any time
soon, however. Even a foreign war, once the surefire option for political
demagogues seeking unified internal political support, is a nonstarter today in
the West.
xxx
Looking to
mimetic theory for clues how to overcome dangers associated with demagoguery
and its use of one-directional malevolent hypnotic suggestion, and how to
introduce a new benevolent dynamic into politics, one may come across loving
mimesis – a very rich and promising concept introduced by Rebecca Adams. And it
is Socrates more than Jesus that may be seen as its exemplar (certainly so as
seen in Hegel’s characterization of his interactions with his pupils). Unlike
in the case of external mediation, where ex
definitione there is no desire in the model concerning the imitator, loving
mimesis is based on an internal mediation of desire that on the part of the
model has as the object the (intended) imitator’s subjectivity and its
fostering. As with the demagogue it may be described as relying on hypnotic
suggestion or “conferral of imitation” (Matthew Taylor), though unlike in the
case of the demagogue – it is done with the best of intentions toward the
intended imitator, certainly not with an intention to further the model’s own
interests first and foremost. In fact it may be seen as self-sacrificial or
renunciatory on the part of the model.
It should be noted
parenthetically that Girard obviously acknowledges the existence of what in
effect is loving mimesis, viz., the mimetic process characteristic of the
relationship of parent and child. Of course it cannot be expected to be egalitarian,
not at the start at least, and though it may use manipulation and power on
occasion, their employment normally is benevolent. The mother uses her knowledge
and experience for the goal of lovingly imparting as much of it as she can to
her child, working in effect to equalize the relationship between them in the
process, and enabling the child to eventually make his or her own decisions.
Now with
regard to Socrates’ ostensibly egalitarian approach, could such a mechanism be
seen as truly egalitarian in character, as it seemingly lacks one of its
preconditions, viz., reciprocity? The problem of a lack of genuine reciprocity
in loving mimesis – technically no leap is possible whereby the imitator would
desire the model’s subjectivity, as that is not the object of the latter’s
desire in their relationship – shows that in order to strike a balance
renunciation and self-sacrifice, already implicit in the model’s interactions,
should openly enter the equation and be acknowledged as valuable qualities,
thus facilitating also their being mimetically learned from the model by the
imitator (and possibly mutually shared), over and above imitating the former’s
desire for the imitator’s subjectivity. In view of the above it bears noting,
however, that in any relationship formed around loving mimesis the model would
stand out anyway, at least initially, as the initiator of the whole process.
That underscores the fact that this benevolent person may naturally become a
leader wielding much political power, if he or she chooses so.
The mimetic
triangle is a power triangle par excellence.
Even analysis of the concept of loving mimesis can only benefit from bearing
that clearly in mind. The difference is that in loving mimesis the inevitable
power play involved need not devolve into a zero-sum game; on the contrary, if
genuinely loving and true to its spirit, starting with the leader, it might
empower all the parties – the whole community involved – over and above what
would normally be their lot. Also, sharing a spirit of renunciation in a social
setting, the power could then be circumscribed in a conscious manner and be only
relative, with a view to making room for the advancement of the common good. In
a shared social climate informed by loving mimesis realization of that goal
could create a self-sustaining or reinforcing upward spiral dynamic as
facilitated by a benevolent leader acting in accord with its spirit.
NB: A
radical vision of loving mimesis would see its flowering as genuinely
reciprocal and egalitarian, and tending naturally toward a state where nobody
is objectified and mere mutual equal recognition is constantly transformed and
uplifted in a feedback loop of mutual desire for each other’s subjectivity;
technically, for this loop to operate it must in fact be predicated not only on
modeling each other’s subjectivity but also on (God-mediated) self-love and
thus leveraged by a sort of twin narcissism. Renunciation and self-sacrifice would
not necessarily be part of its vocabulary.
José María Arizmendiarrieta and
His Brand of Loving Mimesis
“We are realists. Conscious of what
we can and cannot do…we concentrate on those things that we have hopes of
changing among ourselves more than on those things that we cannot change in
others…. Dedicated to changing those things we can and that we are in fact
changing, we are conscious of the force that this movement produces,…”
“One is not born a cooperator, because to be a cooperator requires a social maturity, a training in social living. For one to be an authentic cooperator, capable of cooperating, it is necessary to have learned to tame one’s individualistic or egoistic instincts and to adapt to the laws of cooperation…. One becomes a cooperator through education and the practice of virtue,…”
“To teach only how men should behave with each other, without attacking their egotism, is like plowing in the sea…. Before teaching them public relations and courtesy, we have to get them accustomed to forgetting about themselves,…”
“We do not like men who define themselves as undisputed leaders or who are declared such by interested groups,…”
Don José
María Arizmendiarrieta, quoted above, a self-effacing Catholic priest who
inspired the creation of Mondragón cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain,
was a social and political leader whose leadership style may be seen as
prominently exhibiting qualities of loving mimesis, while Mondragón,
his brainchild ever since it was initiated in 1956, has been an
excellent example of what can be accomplished when loving mimesis is deployed:
it has
grown to become the largest worker cooperative federation in the world, a
business operation based on principles of solidarity and participation that are
said to be in harmony with Catholic social teaching. Its Basic Principles
include: democratic organization, sovereignty of labor, instrumental and
subordinate nature of capital, participatory management, payment equity,
inter-cooperation, social transformation, universality and education. The Mondragón model reflects a
key precept of distributism, namely as wide as possible ownership of the means
of production. That has been the case back home since its foundation, but
Mondragón is apparently committed to eventually effecting that also wherever their
economic expansion might lead them. The Mondragón Corporation is currently the
10th largest Spanish business, employing ca. 75,000 people in almost 100
cooperatives, over 140 subsidiary companies and some 25 other operations in
many countries.
Since this
essay focuses on political and social leadership, what follows, against the
backdrop of post-civil war Spain, is an outline of José María Arizmendiarrieta’s
inspirational loving mimesis as reflected in his actions, exhibiting as they
did his others-empowering leadership style, recorded sayings and writings. He
was not a remarkable orator nor are his writings notable for their style
(though “he had a gift for explaining an idea in brief and potent sentences.
The maxims and slogans he created lived after him and are constantly quoted in
print and in discussions”) yet his benevolent inspiration and indomitable
spirit come across very clearly; they also carry a clear message with respect
to the other issue of interest for the present essay (not developed here at
length, awaiting a more thorough treatment): the order of society that would be
conducive to societal peace and human development.
To be sure, Arizmendiarrieta’s brand
of loving mimesis was not a radical, egalitarianism-emphasizing one (though an increased
social equality was effected on the ground in the process), but – in the
circumstances of post-civil war Spain and in view of his priestly status – was
one relying strongly on renunciation and self-effacement; thus possibly closer
in spirit to Christianity than the other version described above (assuming that
this delimitation is merited).
Having obtained leadership status
almost against himself, he clearly eschewed posturing as a leader who had all
the answers to the problems besetting his followers, choosing instead to inspire
them with ideas and intervening personally only at crucial points and in times
of crises. But even then it would mostly be through seeding them with
additional ideas and insights instead of deciding anything in their place, let
alone insisting on doing that. (William Foote Whyte’s 1991 book Making Mondragón. The Growth and Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative
Complex, describes, however, one
instance of almost surreptitiously creating, with a handful of likeminded
collaborators, a cooperative bank, the Caja Laboral Popular, also the first
second-level cooperative of the Mondragón movement, over and above other
cooperativists’ objections, which turned out crucial, when finally embraced by
them, not only to securing Mondragón’s growth, but, at that particular time, to
its very survival. All quotes in this section are from this book, his direct
quotations, and those of his collaborators, are additionally in italics.)
Consequently, in addition to his
crucial role in initiating the Mondragón experiment, he managed not only to
uplift his immediate followers (few in numbers in fact, seemingly by design),
but to have them transmit this notion of leadership and a spirit of this brand
of loving mimesis to a second (then a third, and so on) generation of
cooperative activists, as well as to generations of regular workers/ co-owners,
for them to carry the torch – while his role for those subsequent generations,
certainly so after his passing in 1976, has shifted to that of external
mediation modeling: “Don José María Arizmendiarrieta resisted any attempts to honor him and
thus personalize the movement he and his associates founded. Now that he is
gone, symbols and images of Arizmendi [as his name was often shortened] pervade
the cooperatives in Mondragón.” But in view of the fact that “Don José María was a man of
simple tastes who never sought any material comforts for himself. In spite of
the urging of his followers, he never drew on Church funds to buy himself an
automobile or allowed others to raise money for one. He was still getting
around on a bicycle,” this modeling carried a distinct mark of modesty.
xxx
To sketch out the scene it is
worth quoting from the book as it reports on some of the most salient points in
the history of the Basque region of that era, and Don José María’s (who was a
native Basque language speaker, like many of those with whom he worked)
inevitable involvement in some of them: Following the civil war, the Basque region
having been an anti-Franco stronghold, “the Basque language was proscribed, and
those speaking it were persecuted… the Basque Church saw its archbishop, Mateo
Mugica, exiled and its clergy submitted to blind persecution… sixteen Basque
priests were shot (including Don José María’s immediate predecessor in Mondragón),
and hundreds were sent to concentration camps, were deported, or escaped into
exile.” In Don José María's own words: “We
lost the Civil War, and we became an occupied region. In the postwar period,
the people of Mondragón suffered severely in the repression. I had known some
people of Mondragón, but when I came after the war they all had either died, or
were in jail, or in exile.”
Since the resistance
to the persecution often took a terrorist tack, especially since the 1959
creation of ETA, not infrequently would Don José María find himself in the middle of
controversy, e.g.: “In 1973, the founder was again attacked, this time for refusing
to justify ETA’s most spectacular act of political violence: the assassination
of Franco’s prime minister, Carrero Blanco. In Trabajo y Union, Don José María
expressed his sorrow about the incident and repudiated violence, but at the
same time stressed the importance of building a new society based on ‘solidarity
and cooperation.’”
But in a
year’s time he chose to rely on the formal leaders of the movement to respond: “The
1974 strike at Ulgor and Fagor Electrotecnica [some of the most important
cooperatives; strikes at cooperatives have been very rare but they do happen as
trade unions are free to operate therein] provoked especially bitter attacks by
ETA on the leaders of the Mondragón movement. It is worth noting that the
founder refrained from taking sides in this argument; instead he wrote of the
dangers of organizational growth leading to bureaucratization.”
xxx
Mondragón still continues to go
strong today (in
addition to Mondragón’s informative web page there are several other books
that one may consult to learn what it represents today, as well as about its
history),
though the forces of globalization threaten its further growth, and even its
very survival cannot be taken for granted. One can be certain, however, that continued
fidelity to the founding spirit of loving mimesis stands the enterprise in good
stead. It is this spirit that is seemingly able to stave off any temptations to
abandon what has been accomplished so far on the social plane (and possibly
cash in on its business aspect), which admittedly represents not only a cooperative
but also a truly communitarian achievement. The founder as external mediation
model would not suffice.
In seeming corroboration of the
above conclusion this is what the book has to say about his style of leadership:
“It is impossible to reproduce Don José María, but we can learn from his
example. A review of the history of worker cooperatives indicates that they
often arise because a single individual has inspired, organized, and built the
organization—and then continued to dominate it. His followers become dependent
on him. When he leaves the organization or dies, the cooperative tends to
deteriorate and eventually disappear.
“Don José María differed sharply
from this pattern. He provided an unusual combination of challenge and support.
Furthermore, except in the case of the creation of the Caja, he did not make
decisions for the members. Rather, he provided a framework for growth, change,
and development. He never held an executive position, which would have given
him the power to dictate decisions. He introduced ideas for new directions of
development, but he never attended regular business meetings of the governing
councils of the cooperatives. He was the primary strategic thinker and planner,
but he left it to others to make the necessary decisions in following the
course that he had helped them chart.
“Don José María was a man of
strong convictions, and he did not hesitate to argue with his co-cooperators.
His strong commitment to anticipating future trends guided his followers in
their openness to change and their organizational creativity.
“In most cases, the founder of a
worker cooperative is also its primary leader at the outset and probably for a
considerable time. Most leaders will therefore not be able to stand aside as
Don José María did, exercising influence without directly making decisions. The
leader, who will probably occupy an executive position, is likely to find it
difficult to restrain himself and guide the members so that they will be able
to make independent and intelligent decisions when he can no longer exert
guidance and authority. He must guard against the natural tendency to let his
original ideas dominate members’ thinking.”
As to Don José María himself, here
is a typically modest assessment of his own role in fostering a climate that in
due course would lead to the establishment of first cooperatives, stressing as
it does the primacy of various aspects of education:
“One
of the main goals commonly shared…was to promote opportunities for practical
education without discrimination. That naturally implied sensitizing people to
the concept that it is necessary to socialize knowledge in order to democratize
power because in fact knowledge is power… It was a process of mobilization,
consciousness raising, and training, of theory and practice, of self-government
and self-management, in which young people, in order to face the serious
problems of financing, organized raffles, festivals, and other public events.
This not only facilitated the financing but also gave the youth—especially the
most dynamic young people—the opportunity to learn practical lessons from
experience. Simultaneously, in this process of interaction, they had the chance
to build up credit with the community in a broader sense. It was this youth
that later on would become the protagonists of the cooperative experience.
Practically, it was they who did everything, because I was the one who reserved
for myself the easiest task—to think aloud. All that I did was to raise ideas
and provoke the young people, and nothing more.”
(It may be relevant in this context to mention
some of his sources of inspiration and self-instruction: “He spoke
of Jesus Christ as the greatest revolutionary in history,” as well as that “Among his readings was The Pedagogy of the Oppressed by Paulo
Freire [Brazilian philosopher and educator, the founder of critical pedagogy], an
influential late-1960s book,…”)
xxx
An
important feature of the expansion of the worker cooperative complex ever since
it was founded has been its effective decentralization: cooperatives would
regularly spin off its distinct operations once they were considered large
enough and self-sustaining; they would then become independent cooperatives, entitled to all the facilities
of the broader cooperative framework, financing, health care, social security,
etc. – all of that subject to an approving vote of the workers/ cooperators of
the entities involved in the devolution.
“Mondragón is a prime example of
a set of organizations that has grown in large measure by following the
principle of complementarity in sharing goods and services among autonomous
organizations. Mondragón thus represents a shift from vertical to horizontal
thinking and also from domination to cooperation…”
Not surprisingly then Don José
María described his political philosophy as pluralist : “In
the minds of the cooperators is the idea that future society probably must be
pluralist in all of its organizations including the economic. There will be
action and interaction of publicly owned firms and private firms, the market
and planning, entities of paternalistic style, capitalistic or social. Every
juncture, the nature of every activity, the level of evolution and development
of every community, will require a special treatment, but not limited to one
form of organization if we believe in and love man, his liberty, and justice,
and democracy,…”
“Cooperativism
seeks to create a new state of conscience, of culture in a word, through the
humanization of power through democracy in economic affairs, and through
solidarity, which impedes the formation of privileged classes. Here and now it
assigns a functional value to property. That is, property is valued in so far
as it serves as an efficient resource for building responsibility and
efficiency in any vision of community life in a decentralized form,…”
He saw
cooperativism as “the third way of
development equidistant from individualistic capitalism and soulless
collectivism. Its center and axis is the human person in his social context,…”
“The cooperativist distinguishes himself from
the capitalist, simply in that the latter utilizes capital in order to make
people serve him, while the former uses it to make more gratifying and
uplifting the working life of the people,…”
He defined the cooperative experience as “an economic effort that translates itself into an educational action or…an educational effort that employs economic action as a vehicle for transformation.” “Cooperatives are schools and centers of training and maturation of those many men that the new order demands,…”
Having inspired, in the early 1960s, and helped with the establishment of Auzo-Lagun, a women’s cooperative – against the objections of some traditionally-minded men and women – he wrote, “Let women decide their fate for themselves…. half of adult people do not have any right to rule the destinies of the other half.” ‘On equal rights on the job, he noted that “based on the recognition of the equality of man and woman, all jobs, except those specifically proscribed for medical reasons…will be distributed without any discrimination. We repeat, the only valid arguments are of a physiological character, whose definition depends upon the medical service,…”’
Equilibrium was a key concept in his conception of democracy: “Men spend themselves and become exhausted: democracy is a resource for renovation. A community acts because every one of its components feels a stimulus to action, but in the final analysis it must harmonize its interests with those of others, because it is then when, with a common effort, all end up gaining. Democracy must serve to find the point of equilibrium,…”
“Democracy loyally and honestly felt and practiced cannot limit itself to the formalities and administrative expedients of the elective process, but rather must have its impact and be reflected as much in the educational and social fields as in the economic and financial fields through building it into the institutionalization process,…”
xxx
And this is how he was seen by
his first collaborators, many of them young people at the time:
“In our first contacts with Don José María,
really he put us to sleep talking about his ideas, we had no understanding of
the implications of these ideas. What we did, following the leads he opened up
for us, we did simply because we were men who felt the desire to do things, and
also because of the confidence in himself he built in us through his tenacity
and stubbornness, which motivated us and made us think…. At this time, frankly,
his speaking ability in Spanish was poor—although he wrote very well, he lacked
oral facility, and it was hard work for him to communicate with us. But he was
tenacious. Once he confessed to me that this difficulty was a form of penance
that God had imposed on him because what he wanted to do most was transmit
ideas, and yet he had the least talent for that. This led him to force himself
to transmit the essence of his ideas, and the lack of fluency made him think
more deeply. He has been a man of enormous drive who always went for the
essential and not for the superficial. He was always pointing us in different
directions, with a practical sense. His theory of education was that young
people—even when very young—had to accustom themselves to taking practical
actions, they had to participate in initiatives of any kind, from making things
for Christmas to taking steps in any other activity. The important thing was
that there be continual practice, so that initiative, responsibility, and
commitment can be developed and demonstrated. In this way, he led us to develop
channels that were then open to us. Because it was an era of political
hibernation, in the sense that there was no opening for political action, the
only institution that had certain options open was the Church.”
“Don José María never distinguished himself as
an orator. Fundamentally, his gift was a capacity for personal
dialogue…besides, contrary to what was customary, instead of flattering us when
we went to consult him, he treated us with affection but urged us every day to
make a greater commitment to the labor movement and to the future economic and
social transformation of society. Misled somewhat by capitalistic thinking in
our first phase, we thought the solutions could be found in social reforms of a
paternalistic type within capitalist society. But Don José María always
insisted that the solution was not to be found in casual reforms but rather in
structural reforms; that is to say it was necessary to change the sovereignty
of capital to the sovereignty of labor.”
“Don José María is a
typical man of the countryside, very pragmatic, with practical judgment, and
inclined to orient his ideas toward realities. Beginning with the conception
that the idea that can’t be expressed in words is not a good idea, and the word
that can’t be translated into action is not a good word, he guided Accion
Catolica along original and unorthodox lines. In that era Accion Catolica was
busying itself with things of minor importance—whether or not dancing should be
permitted. We were disciples who year after year educated ourselves, thanks to
the teachings of Don José María, along lines of social concerns and toward a
translation of religious ideas into something that would link up with our real
world. Don José María imbued us with the idea that being a man meant to occupy
one’s self and do something. That is taken for granted now, but in those days
there was a spiritual, scholastic, and puristic atmosphere in the Church. In
other places, Accion Catolica taught different ideas, people dedicated
themselves to Castilian mysticism. Don José María was different in that he was
telling us that men have problems and must work in the building of their world.
From Don José María I learned that work was not a punishment—which I had been
taught earlier—but rather the realization of the Creation and collaboration
with the plan of God…. Thanks to the establishment of the Escuela Profesional [a
technical college created by and for the cooperatives], we developed the idea that in order to do things we needed technical
competence as well as spiritual witness and personal effort.”
“What surprises other entrepreneurs is the
poetic-philosophic vein that we have as entrepreneurs. This humanistic
inclination that surprises them we owe to Don José María, because we could
never dissociate our entrepreneurial attitudes from a philosophy, a concept, an
ideology, after the contact we had had with him. We could not be pure
technocrats, who know perfectly the processes of chemistry or physics or
semi-conductors but nothing more. We have never been pure technocrats. We see
the development of these firms as a social struggle, a duty.”
One of his close friends, Simon de Arroiabe, described the founder’s conception of the revolution: “For him the revolution should not be centered as much in the political sphere as in the infrastructure of society from the most primary and elemental cells up to the most global (the nation). Many times I have heard him attack the obsession with the political, for polarizing the revolution in terms of political power. Basically he saw the danger in converting the political into an absolute, from which one would accomplish the revolution. Any group, he would say to me, that considers itself revolutionary must overcome this mentality, or its revolution will be simply a taking of power to install another tyranny of different coloration, but basically a tyranny and a dictatorship. For him the revolution had to be based on other perspectives, taking more into account the “cultural” infrastructure…. The revolution that the cooperators must bring about is primarily a cultural revolution,…”
In conclusion
A question may be asked, Is it justifiable to describe the Mondragón experiment in terms of or referring to loving mimesis, in addition to analyzing it in more usual terms, those of a social movement successfully implementing meaningful societal change? My answer is a resounding yes. For one thing, there are many idiosyncratic characteristics of this movement, as well as concerning its founder, his motivation and actions – sketched above – that not only seem responsible for its initial success but also for its endurance and unhurried, steady growth. Arguably one of the most important among them, certainly constituting the chief motif that actuated the founder, has been the stress on knowledge, education and personal growth, but one geared mostly toward action and involvement, such as would benefit community first and foremost, that would foster a community of friendly neighbors. Consequently, a legacy of loving mimesis lives on among the Mondragón people today, even though the founder may have assumed by now the position of external mediation model.
Extrapolating from the above material, it may be reassuring to realize that the functioning of democracy, be it liberal or perhaps even purely majoritarian, need not necessarily polarize society, as it increasingly does today, that loving mimesis can be deployed and be effective in the public arena when operating within its framework – since it was able to accomplish that under an authoritarian regime. Moreover, from the standpoint of mimetic theory one should not be discouraged by its necessarily limited scope of individual operation: on the contrary, not only may its benevolent ways and means contribute to the creation of societal plurality – provided that loving mimesis-guided persons and their initiatives proliferate – but also the limited scope itself may in fact help diffuse in the process that most malevolent dynamic of a devolving liberal democracy, viz., an ever deepening societal polarization.
The described operation’s limited scope does not result either from recognition of one’s inability to accomplish more. It has been commensurate all along with its stated goals as well as with its overall vision of society, and the operation’s place and role therein – as may clearly be gathered from the quotations above: that it can only be so or along similar lines derives from what loving mimesis is about. It is as far a cry from political demagoguery as it gets, and as far a cry from its rapacious ambitions. Loving mimesis’ apparent ability to create true communities of committed and caring people instead of relying on atomized, angry, resentful individuals, as is the case with political demagoguery – always aiming at and increasingly capable of making them over into a malleable, beholden mass – holds out a promise that societal peace need not be accomplished via resorting to the scapegoat mechanism. But its promise is much grander – instead of fitful societal equilibriums, hardly even felt as such these days, harmonious societal change becomes possible. If this essay gives any clues, all it would seemingly take is that people like Don José María Arizmendiarrieta abound and be allowed to operate, the latter at least within society’s power.
But if we are open and attentive, and perhaps have some luck, we just might start noticing such people around us already hard at work, ever creating circles of loving intersubjectivity that are renewing and empowering our communities, and beckoning us to join, to get involved and benefit ourselves and others close by – instead of letting unscrupulous demagogues delude us with their sinister simplistic schemes to keep us divided and isolated, and firmly in their thrall.
No comments:
Post a Comment