The Scandal of Innocent Scapegoater & Guilty Scapegoat in Modernity

Contemporary rampant indiscriminate scapegoating is a sign of mimetic undifferentiation. In our modern post-Christian world it normally does not degenerate into violent sacrificial rituals. Instead it signifies internal mediation that manifests itself as scapegoating and that seems to be in constant search of new and ever more ingenious and outrageous, though sometimes actually only inane, forms of itself – such as could give the scapegoater the edge, if only temporary, over against his/her mimetic double.

A strange and scandalous form of this new wave of scapegoating/undifferentiation rears its head in accusations of scapegoating leveled at those who do not so much as engage in any real scapegoating themselves (sometimes no such allegations are even initially made by the accuser, though most of the time in mimetic fervor they will eventually be made), but instead refuse to see or acknowledge as scapegoating only-factually-based critical remarks, directed by them, or even by a third party, at yet another party, the latter being such that both sides of the mimetic exchange agree is a scapegoater.

The circular logic of mimetic undifferentiatiation behind it would seem to be at least partly based on a suspicion that the refusing party is a scapegoater in hiding or denial – since the acknowledged scapegoater must be the easiest target of scapegoating in our modern world, a thus the whole exercise must of necessity result in his/her being scapegoated, in the event by the refusing party. Then the suspicion is able to cast its mimetic shadow over both parties, and soon they are taking turns as both the scapegoater and one being scapegoated.

Yet there’s another characteristic of this new type of scapegoating, one related to the Girardian definition of the phenomenon in its most orthodox form, that makes it even more insidious and almost beyond control in mimetic rivalry. Scapegoating to be that must be an activity or attitude that is nonconscious. This characteristic is truly crucial and as insidious as can be: how can you defend yourself against accusations of being a scapegoater when for you to be one means not to know about it? It’s a logical impossibility and psychological trap, a veritable double bind. You either admit that you are one, where paradoxically your admission ostensibly lets you off the hook – you’re no longer technically a scapegoater, just a vile individual probably relishing doing harm or maligning your fellow human beings; or you deny it, which denial is taken up by your mimetic rival as proof of your being a scapegoater, only to be triumphantly hurled at you as an accusation, and one that cannot be deflected. So when faced with such a charge you must be reacting with anger shading quickly into rage. And then you turn on your mimetic rival, doing the very same thing to him/her. Then, as Girard might say, Satan has accomplished his task of successfully turning the lives of mimetic doubles into an accusatory duel turning on scapegoating.

The obvious observation, though in reality not that obvious to many, is that as law causes sin so does Girard’s definition of scapegoating produce and foment this form of no-violent-resolution-available-type scapegoating that becomes or is red-hot internal mediation.

If at this point the reader is curious whether the present argumentation has any bearing on the fact that any criticism of Donald Trump is interpreted by some as scapegoating him, my answer is: you bet it does. Even a criticism limiting itself to just pointing to the facts of his outrageous scapegoating of others seems to be all too easily subsumed under the term. This “defense” of Trump is then normally followed by an accusation or allegation that the one ostensibly scapegoating Trump is turning a blind eye to the misdeeds, nay, the true scapegoating perpetrated by his political rivals. In mimetic frenzy the defender of Trump is trying to run the political agenda of his neighbor whose politics differs from that of his own.  

In terms of setting the stage for scapegoating Girard was adamant about two things: that for SCAPEGOATING to be effective, or even to be termed that, it HAS TO BE NONCONSCIOUS (the scapegoater calls it justice then); and that THE SCAPEGOAT IS INNOCENT, though obviously this is not admitted or seen by the scapegoater. According to Girard that actually is what scapegoating in the mimetic sense, at least in a mythical context, is about. It seems justifiable then to say that any other configuration, e.g.,  guilty scapegoat deemed guilty by scapegoater, is not scapegoating in light of mimetic theory.

But then there is Girard's admonition to be on the lookout for possible signs of the allegedly guilty party's innocence when seeing how more and more people are ganging up on him. And even if he is guilty beyond the shadow of a doubt, would one not have a change of heart seeing a crowd that is undeniably mimetic, gathering around him to do their regular job of lynching, even if not necessarily physical? 

The tension between the two conditions as it is more and more experienced in modern real life scenarios, the interplay of relative importance attached to either of those conditions in a situation where there is doubt, or can be cast by mimetic rivals, whether conditions are simultaneously met,  is again such as to lead man astray into yet another round of internal mediation, over the issue as such, or its present exemplification.

Of course any distinction between scapegoating and justice, especially if unqualified, can easily come under criticism – one based both on history and, possibly even more strongly, on the Gospels: Paul’s “if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin;” and, by extension, "where there is law, there is crime" (Solzhenitsyn; this sentiment is shared by some in the West). But if we proceed along these lines we will most probably be internally mediating and scapegoating one another over the issue what is justifiably penalized (as opposed to constituting scapegoating dressed in judicial garb) and what is not, and what are the real motives behind either. There’s no easy way out of the mimetic circle for man, if it is at all possible – or even truly desirable.

Yet I happen to be of the opinion that reasonable differentiation between scapegoating and justice is called for in a world that is in thrall to mimetic undifferentiation and internal mediation. If heeded what it can do in many circumstances is dissipate some of the heavy fog of undifferentiation, and afford us salutary respites from internal mediation. We must at least try to prevail over our mythical inheritance and mimetic endowment in its crudest forms.

Instead of nonconscious indiscriminate scapegoating, conscious empathetic involvement should be the order of the day. It is only the latter attitude that affords one clear seeing of the nature of scapegoating in our modern world. Empathy, mostly a right-brain faculty, is not wide-eyed innocence it is purported to be by some. Instead empathy, the basis of good mimesis, can go a long way toward inoculating one against mimetic rivalry over the issue. Even when insisting on relying on truth, good mimesis must be ready to absorb the pain and violence instead of passing them on.  It certainly is not preordained for defeat, it can also prevail, as in a spirit of hope should be believed by people of good will, certainly including Girardians, and especially Girardian Christians.Początek formularza

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