Interdividual as a Gestalt

Why are  our takeaways from Rene Girard’s mimetic theory on many occasions seemingly so diametrically different? And does it have to be that way? In a world of competing narratives, is there a way of apprehending the whole, without necessarily having to predict or work out any final outcome in dialectic-like fashion? In his last works Girard apparently, though with some reserve, points to such a possibility, yet Girardians seem on the whole to disregard it. That includes Christians among us. The reason might be that gaining such apprehension would have to go hand in hand with, it is feared, an excessively demanding way of living.

With only tentative status in mimetic theory, and probably never meant to have any other, this solution is called “innermost mediation,” that of Christ. Able to reconcile rather than just reciprocate, capable of giving us the peace of what Girard calls “good transcendence” in the face of rampant internal mediation, it also affords a corresponding perceptual faculty that enables seeing from the perspective of  Pascal’s “exact point,” from the true place of charity within us. A charity that sees life with its capacity for transformation. And though it is about much more than just seeing or understanding, to get a sense of what is involved with regard to holistic perception we might find it worthwhile to avail ourselves of insights that Gestalt theory could provide. I will turn to it later.

Calling ourselves Girardians implies that we have acquired a body of knowledge that we appreciate, and a specific terminology we use. But when Girard ventures into areas and times that bear on us directly just as we interact with one another, we tend to fall back on our preexisting ideas and values, such as our reading of Girard has not been able to change.  On the contrary, it seems to us that mimetic theory only managed to bolster all of our cherished attitudes. That it has given us new tools to all the more adroitly defend our positions, to be able to show how pusillanimous if not plain stupid or evil are those of our rivals. In fact, appreciating what role competition plays in man seems to have imparted a zest to it in our eyes, thus allowing us to better compete with one another rather than sensitizing us to the dangers of it.

Nowhere is it better evident than when Girard speaks of two modern totalitarianisms, one being an updated version of what normally is associated with the term, the kind that in effect repudiates the Christian concern for victims; the other – called super-Christianity, epitomized by political correctness – being a stance where seemingly the only value left is the care of the victim, official Christianity actually seen as oppressive and victim-producing. Not entering into a thorough debate on the above, suffice it to state that the former, even when watered down and shading into the middle via its “patriotic” versions, is still redolent of the sacred and its attendant violence perpetrated IN THE NAME AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE COLLECTIVE, often unashamedly so. The latter, while priding itself on having expulsed violence altogether, unwittingly employs softer, “civilized” versions of it to make sure that the very violence it ostensibly shuns does not rear its ugly head, meanwhile spreading victimhood culture, all of that apparently FOR THE SAKE OF THE INDIVIDUAL, his rights and freedoms.

It should be clear to any reader of Girard that he has not sided with either of those alternatives. Can thus adherents of either in good faith call themselves Girardians? But can man NOT be on either side of the divide? Even if that is what Girard was apparently trying to do himself, whilst, in his last works, explicitly showing us the dangers of mimetic contagion escalating to extremes? Even knowing that failing to see the whole situation for what it really is and taking sides, thus succumbing to the contagion, would amount to fueling its flames?

Now being in the middle of the fray obviously makes seeing the danger and heeding his warning virtually impossible. But even stepping out of it will not make it much easier, a realization backed up by Gestalt psychology’s principles of visual perception. Even when we see two distinct objects, yet such as we sense that cannot exist without each other, we can only see one of them as figure, the other then being vaguely perceived as its mere ground. We can switch, especially when instructed and directed to do so, but even knowing that the two figures coexist in the picture, we will not be able to make them out at the same time. Only sequential perception is possible. This being so, we attempt to all the more clearly differentiate between figure and ground in order to avoid or minimize perceptual confusion. But by thus giving free rein to left-brain focused attention, we waive attempts to gain a comprehensive awareness or intuition of the whole.

The above is a useful description or metaphor of our societal predicament: instead of seeing the whole “Girardian” picture, we see as figure that which we perceive as relatively smaller and better defined, which most often happens to be us and our embattled position in need of defense – against the less defined, if not amorphous, but larger and thus threatening background, although a reverse seeing and classification is also possible. We also tend to paint everything in black and white, again applying the gestalt principle of contrast between figure and ground. All of that goes to underscore that if we stop defending our position, defending ourselves, that is, we will be swamped by the expanding morass that is this threatening, attacking background (and of course if it’s we who attack it’s only because it’s the best defense). Lacking our valiant effort, our “moral majority” will immediately become a demoralized minority, possibly in danger of being violently scapegoated. Signs of this happening are writ large, are burned into our minds.

Ours is a complex gestalt configuration. Not only we apparently cannot exist without each other, but, moreover, there is an ambiguity in the “we,” as it is “they” that seem to constitute us, corresponding to the ambiguity of the figure-ground relationship of the gestalt. And consequently, Girard’s description of our modern, post-Christian situation can also be seen as ambiguous, in the sense that it could be interpreted as supporting either side. Of course that ambiguity can be done away with rather easily, but many a time only temporarily: in a flash of insight throwing in bold relief our understanding, suddenly retrieved from the “Girardian” gestalt, that ostensibly supports one side only, one that happens to be ours. It has been done in the past, is being done, and will be done in the future. It should thus be incumbent upon us to recognize that movement within while striving to see the big picture.

In our modern world, when compensating for this ambiguity, instead of all of us ganging up on a single scapegoat, we paradoxically tend to accord to our rivals, both on the individual and the societal level, a symmetrical status with that of ours. Fed by doubt as much as by a spirit of mimetic competition, we tend to split into groupings of almost equal number or strength. Thus our gestalt configuration becomes symmetrical, regular, “logical,” and thus that much easier to perceive AS A WHOLE. If we do not avail ourselves of this opportunity on most occasions, it is because we almost never adopt a point of view that would enable it, mired as we are in the mimetic fray. And on the individual level this internally-mediated rivalry whose object is the being of the other, is accompanied by a split within ourselves, again down the middle. In our life’s hall of mirrors there is a constant tug of war born of reflecting the other. That is the whole that we are as mimetic in(ter)dividuals.

If mimetic theory does not support either side of the contemporary mimetic rivalry, it does provide a grammar with which to describe the human predicament. It paints a holistic picture. With a sage like Rene Girard it could not have been otherwise, that is what makes him a thinker of stature. He knew that he would have destroyed the magnificent edifice of his anthropology had he done otherwise. His effort at a dialectical solution was tentative at best if there was one, exhorting to imitate Christ rather than capping his theory with Jesus’ innermost mediation as paradigmatic for man’s survival, one necessarily predicated on a forgiveness that would enable man to maintain Christ-like innocence when victimized. An innocence grounded in His charitable seeing. But Girard has managed to sensitize us to the mechanism that underlies the never-ending gestalt that we are as societies and individuals – that of the mimetic pattern of successive otherization and undifferentiation. That is a prerequisite enabling us to freeze-frame this flowing gestalt if we really wanted.

Being sensitized, acquiring a truly comprehensive point of view, also makes for being able to flip between the figure and the ground of our gestalt, in their changing capacity. The most creative gestalt configurations are the easily reversible ones, those with figure-ground boundaries blurred and their sizes and “densities” nearly equal. And instead of seeing and fearing an approaching undifferentiation, it is much more fruitful to see in them an inbuilt creative ambiguity. Such as is also characteristic of mimetic theory’s open-ended description of the human fate.

Ambiguity is evident, for one, in the realization that we are INTERDIVIDUALS, with our boundaries blurred because in fact they are constituted by the other, or rather by our perception of the other. Our mimetically-mediated relationships are ambiguous, meaning that the figure that one part of us currently is could the next minute be the ground, and vice-versa, as we mirror each other and experience the constant tension of mediated desires that rise and subside seemingly equally on both sides of whatever divide we perceive at the moment. That which makes us human beings also makes us unable to exist as humans in isolation, without one another – and yet we are more than the sum of its codependent parts. The seeming chaos that modern society is, in fact is a kind of order. If we but apprehended that, we would know that we are the ultimate Gestalt. We are God’s good creation. 

The Scandal of Innocent Scapegoater & Guilty Scapegoat in Modernity

Contemporary rampant indiscriminate scapegoating is a sign of mimetic undifferentiation. In our modern post-Christian world it normally does not degenerate into violent sacrificial rituals. Instead it signifies internal mediation that manifests itself as scapegoating and that seems to be in constant search of new and ever more ingenious and outrageous, though sometimes actually only inane, forms of itself – such as could give the scapegoater the edge, if only temporary, over against his/her mimetic double.

A strange and scandalous form of this new wave of scapegoating/undifferentiation rears its head in accusations of scapegoating leveled at those who do not so much as engage in any real scapegoating themselves (sometimes no such allegations are even initially made by the accuser, though most of the time in mimetic fervor they will eventually be made), but instead refuse to see or acknowledge as scapegoating only-factually-based critical remarks, directed by them, or even by a third party, at yet another party, the latter being such that both sides of the mimetic exchange agree is a scapegoater.

The circular logic of mimetic undifferentiatiation behind it would seem to be at least partly based on a suspicion that the refusing party is a scapegoater in hiding or denial – since the acknowledged scapegoater must be the easiest target of scapegoating in our modern world, a thus the whole exercise must of necessity result in his/her being scapegoated, in the event by the refusing party. Then the suspicion is able to cast its mimetic shadow over both parties, and soon they are taking turns as both the scapegoater and one being scapegoated.

Yet there’s another characteristic of this new type of scapegoating, one related to the Girardian definition of the phenomenon in its most orthodox form, that makes it even more insidious and almost beyond control in mimetic rivalry. Scapegoating to be that must be an activity or attitude that is nonconscious. This characteristic is truly crucial and as insidious as can be: how can you defend yourself against accusations of being a scapegoater when for you to be one means not to know about it? It’s a logical impossibility and psychological trap, a veritable double bind. You either admit that you are one, where paradoxically your admission ostensibly lets you off the hook – you’re no longer technically a scapegoater, just a vile individual probably relishing doing harm or maligning your fellow human beings; or you deny it, which denial is taken up by your mimetic rival as proof of your being a scapegoater, only to be triumphantly hurled at you as an accusation, and one that cannot be deflected. So when faced with such a charge you must be reacting with anger shading quickly into rage. And then you turn on your mimetic rival, doing the very same thing to him/her. Then, as Girard might say, Satan has accomplished his task of successfully turning the lives of mimetic doubles into an accusatory duel turning on scapegoating.

The obvious observation, though in reality not that obvious to many, is that as law causes sin so does Girard’s definition of scapegoating produce and foment this form of no-violent-resolution-available-type scapegoating that becomes or is red-hot internal mediation.

If at this point the reader is curious whether the present argumentation has any bearing on the fact that any criticism of Donald Trump is interpreted by some as scapegoating him, my answer is: you bet it does. Even a criticism limiting itself to just pointing to the facts of his outrageous scapegoating of others seems to be all too easily subsumed under the term. This “defense” of Trump is then normally followed by an accusation or allegation that the one ostensibly scapegoating Trump is turning a blind eye to the misdeeds, nay, the true scapegoating perpetrated by his political rivals. In mimetic frenzy the defender of Trump is trying to run the political agenda of his neighbor whose politics differs from that of his own.  

In terms of setting the stage for scapegoating Girard was adamant about two things: that for SCAPEGOATING to be effective, or even to be termed that, it HAS TO BE NONCONSCIOUS (the scapegoater calls it justice then); and that THE SCAPEGOAT IS INNOCENT, though obviously this is not admitted or seen by the scapegoater. According to Girard that actually is what scapegoating in the mimetic sense, at least in a mythical context, is about. It seems justifiable then to say that any other configuration, e.g.,  guilty scapegoat deemed guilty by scapegoater, is not scapegoating in light of mimetic theory.

But then there is Girard's admonition to be on the lookout for possible signs of the allegedly guilty party's innocence when seeing how more and more people are ganging up on him. And even if he is guilty beyond the shadow of a doubt, would one not have a change of heart seeing a crowd that is undeniably mimetic, gathering around him to do their regular job of lynching, even if not necessarily physical? 

The tension between the two conditions as it is more and more experienced in modern real life scenarios, the interplay of relative importance attached to either of those conditions in a situation where there is doubt, or can be cast by mimetic rivals, whether conditions are simultaneously met,  is again such as to lead man astray into yet another round of internal mediation, over the issue as such, or its present exemplification.

Of course any distinction between scapegoating and justice, especially if unqualified, can easily come under criticism – one based both on history and, possibly even more strongly, on the Gospels: Paul’s “if it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin;” and, by extension, "where there is law, there is crime" (Solzhenitsyn; this sentiment is shared by some in the West). But if we proceed along these lines we will most probably be internally mediating and scapegoating one another over the issue what is justifiably penalized (as opposed to constituting scapegoating dressed in judicial garb) and what is not, and what are the real motives behind either. There’s no easy way out of the mimetic circle for man, if it is at all possible – or even truly desirable.

Yet I happen to be of the opinion that reasonable differentiation between scapegoating and justice is called for in a world that is in thrall to mimetic undifferentiation and internal mediation. If heeded what it can do in many circumstances is dissipate some of the heavy fog of undifferentiation, and afford us salutary respites from internal mediation. We must at least try to prevail over our mythical inheritance and mimetic endowment in its crudest forms.

Instead of nonconscious indiscriminate scapegoating, conscious empathetic involvement should be the order of the day. It is only the latter attitude that affords one clear seeing of the nature of scapegoating in our modern world. Empathy, mostly a right-brain faculty, is not wide-eyed innocence it is purported to be by some. Instead empathy, the basis of good mimesis, can go a long way toward inoculating one against mimetic rivalry over the issue. Even when insisting on relying on truth, good mimesis must be ready to absorb the pain and violence instead of passing them on.  It certainly is not preordained for defeat, it can also prevail, as in a spirit of hope should be believed by people of good will, certainly including Girardians, and especially Girardian Christians.Początek formularza

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Internal Mediation in Liberal Democracies of the Post-Christian World

We subconsciously fear the violence inherent in undifferentiation, so we strive to assume and then maintain an identity that would be different from that of our “others,” especially those closest to us – my neighbor, as opposed to my friend (until s/he becomes a mimetic obstacle to me); neighboring nations; social class just below my station; etc.

We no longer have the (easy) recourse to violent scapegoating that while restoring peace to the community would also bestow an identity, if only temporarily, on us, one based on a common act of violence/murder.

Since we as (post-)Christians strive not to engage in the latter, we have gradually and haltingly developed a system of liberal democracy, where majority rule is supposed to safeguard minority rights. But those of us who might expect that under such a system violence and scapegoating would disappear are of course disappointed. Also, theories abound to the effect that politics is predicated on the friend-enemy distinction or that it actually is about violence: that’s how man forges ahead. Any political theory that would, theoretically or practically, deny this imperative stands condemned as foggy thinking, to say the least. That’s also how liberal democracy is being denigrated by those who favor unashamed power politics.

For those less theoretically-minded there might be something wrong with liberal democracy inasmuch as it is felt that it denies one a definite identity that would differentiate one from one’s “other.” In search of an identity over against the other even a (post-)Christian might eventually be ready to unreflexively fall back on scapegoating, even of a violent sort. The issue is further compounded by the fact that liberal democracy does proscribe certain types of self-identity, those that the system deems as threatening to the most vulnerable, underprivileged and discriminated against.

There are excesses in this last exercise – in the shape of a growing victimhood culture – that are, still under liberal democracy, protested against. And true to form it happens in a spirit of internal mediation – the system is being accused by its detractors of seemingly disregarding other victims, many a time those that the other side, and the system, as the accusers would have it, paints as scapegoaters . But we are now at a point where instead of relying on the system to fight those excesses from within in order to curb them, the validity of the system is being questioned by many who increasingly characterize it as an aberration of sorts. No thought seems to be given to the fact that the collapse of the house of liberal democracy would most probably spell the return of unmitigated scapegoating (this is in fact already happening) that would naturally tend towards its time-enshrined violent resolution. There are ready-to-hand examples of the latter in the West’s not so distant past.  

It takes Girardian thought though to realize that liberal democracy is not this foggy wishy-washy system of decrepit nonviolence it is purported to be by some of its critics. No, any Girardian should be able to instantly realize that IN PRACTICE liberal democracy can never be about the total lack of violence – much to many of its proponents’ dismay – or doing away with the friend/enemy distinction, or with any distinct identity, for that matter. It is plain to see in the context of mimetic theory. It is after all under internal mediation of man’s mimetic desire, the one prevalent under liberal democracy, that our mimetic model/mediator becomes our mimetic obstacle, the worst enemy there could be.

(There are obviously other types of criticism leveled at it, such as that it actually serves the elites while paying only lip service to safeguarding the rights of the underprivileged; any political system does that, some more, some less openly than others, while certainly the overturning of a political system in due course will produce a new elite that in turn will be no different with respect to this phenomenon, though tables might be turned as to who gets to be elite and who underprivileged. What is of utmost interest for me is in what manner that is effected, i.e., the issue of the relative level of violence present in various political systems.)

If so, is liberal democracy any different from all the other openly violent political systems? Well, I think it is. It has less to do with its more or less openly proclaimed adherence, and many a time plainly disingenuously so, to avoiding violence, at least at home, that is. What is of paramount importance is its internal dynamic when it comes to dealing with conflict and rivalry. This dynamic in my opinion stems as much from the system as a theoretical and legal construct as it does from an internal mediation of man’s mimetic desire that is denied, by dint of culture and religion, the downward spiral into a sacrificial violent resolution. If I am not mistaken, the latter has so far been more or less disregarded by political theoreticians as a powerful mechanism underlying the system.

In the end the strength of liberal democracy does not rest on its moral grandeur or utopian beauty. It does not even consist in its undeniably less violent nature as compared to other political systems. It has to do with why this last phenomenon is actually effected, and more in practice than by design at that. In reality it consists in letting that which underlies the system, i.e., the internal mediation of man’s mimetic desire, to have free rein in a world that has seemingly learned to be sensitive to human rights and liberties as well as apparently abhors excessive violence, while, and that’s systemic as well as cultural and religious, making sure that there’s no falling back on the time-tested-and-enshrined resolution of political struggles and conflicts, on the ritual of violent expulsion/murder of the innocent scapegoat. If the latter prohibition might feel as violence (figuratively speaking) done to the community, it is because that last endeavor might still, as it always has, serve the purpose of solidifying the community’s peace (here: at the expense of that unfortunate substitutionary victim), and of bestowing a common identity on the community, though in reality it be that of murderers.

But paradoxically the systemic safeguards that are in place will be able to hold if – and as long as – internal mediation is thriving. Why not just say: is allowed to thrive? Allowing to thrive is one thing, but if it becomes less vigorous and withers, undifferentiation might already be setting in and identity problems instead of being painfully clear and thus discussed and fought about, might be working subconsciously to produce a mimetic crisis in need of a radical, yet time-honored, resolution. Such a time could easily throw up a demagogue who would work the conflict as a society restorer, in a truly demiurge-like fashion. Man is never beyond a return to sacrificial mores.

And yet I have been time and again struck how effective internal mediation in Western societies is today, and so how effectively it is able to uphold the house of liberal democracy. It actually is easy to see why: every issue is presented or seemingly presents itself as a binary. And in a true spirit of internal mediation everyone is faced with a 0-1 choice. Those binaries are in “ontological” need of proponent and opponent! It all seems to somehow correspond with Girard’s “metaphysical desire” that underlies internal mediation. And is it really a mystery that societal groupings around those binaries seemingly are of almost equal force/numbers? Maybe that’s the primal survival skill of our society. Just look at the inbuilt inequality in Rwanda (85-15) and its horrific results.

Of course not everybody in society participates in those political struggles, or rather – not in all of them. Some are indifferent to some of them, some feel powerless to effect any change, some are more tolerant and refuse to see every issue as a binary. But almost everybody will get involved at least on some issues. And then they will feel the push/pull of a mass movement at least when elections roll around. And feel drawn to join/identify with this or that crowd which of necessity is but a coalition of groups – and opinions, many of them seemingly at variance with one another. And yet it all seems to work! The miracle of the eventual us versus them equation is able to cast its society-invigorating spell.

Recent reports have it that Donald Trump is (contemplating) moving towards the center. I was expecting/hoping for that much. Under liberal democracy it’s not only normal and expected around any election time; in fact the opposite is suicidal to one’s prospects of success within the system. It is reasonable to interpret such a move as showing that one intends to play/is playing by the system’s rules. Then the struggle will be – as it is most of the time – for a tipping-the-scales majority. If this yet-putative move on his part is genuinely backed by a change of heart, if elected Trump will be able to move a bit the political center itself – around which everything coalesces. And that’s what change under liberal democracy is about.

Obviously in the event some of his supporters will be outraged at his not making good on what they thought were his major planks – and in due course new leaders will start showing up, new political agendas will start coming to light, and new coalitions will start forming to surface for the next election. The spirit of internal mediation will continue to imbue the whole political scene.

Of course a different scenario is still possible, but seems unlikely to me now. Yet once again, we’re not beyond the point of no return as it comes to sacrificial violence as a political ritual. And once again, all of us need to get involved in the political process to cumulatively stamp out that last threat – by sheer unconscious effect of an internal mediation manifesting itself as it does in our post-Christian world, if not by any other means. Let us not wait on the sidelines to become easy pickings for some hell-bent demagogue when we eventually have had it.

Yet I don’t expect to convince any of liberal democracy opponents as to its value. If I were, all I would show would be my lack of understanding what internal mediation is all about. And how it can give and/or bolster the sense of one’s identity. Why should an avowed opponent of liberal democracy suddenly drop a seemingly very significant part of his/her self-identity and come to my side, thus undifferentiating with me? No, I don’t expect or even ask him/her to do that. All I can hope for is that we can retain our disagreements, including this one, while engaging in politics under the current system. The system which is amenable to change, though as a rule only gradually and haltingly, but in a significantly less violent manner than any other political system known to or tried by man so far.

There’s one more reason why convincing anybody of the values of liberal democracy is a hard thing to contemplate, or at least it is counterintuitive for the committed Christian. Its underlying phenomenon, the internal mediation of man’s mimetic desire, is not a state of mind and spirit that the Christian would want to see prevail in man. It is very precarious in nature and always in danger of devolving – much more than its antecedent, i.e., external mediation – into a full-blown mimetic crisis replete with violent sacrificial rituals. In fact this is what war waged by modern liberal democracies outside their borders is all about. As always nobody seems to see and acknowledge the scapegoats, the true substitutionary victims of an effort to expel the bubbling violence beyond the bounds of the national community. And bestow on or restore to that community a sense of self-identity that happens to be truly sacrificial – both with respect to the domestic scapegoats (the soldiers) and the outside victims (the terrorists, real or only purported; the stubborn nations that won’t abide by the rules of liberal democracy as interpreted by the powers that be, etc.).

Toward the end of his life Rene Girard spoke of yet another form of man’s mimetic mediation, one that seemingly offers new vistas for mankind. But he seemed to be very tentative about it. And so should the committed Christian be preaching the virtues of kenotic innermost mediation of the one who has once and for all made null and void the need for sacrificial rituals, including war? Not is a traditional sense, as this would be both counterproductive as well as driven by the very logic of internal mediation. Instead s/he should be humbly offering themselves as an example to imitate, to follow, just as they – hopefully – are faithfully following Jesus Christ. The kenotic imitation of Jesus Christ must be humble inasmuch as it cannot be associated with demanding or even expecting to see any results. The preeminent Christian virtue called for in this respect is hope. And as the hoped for results will be, as they have always been, very slow in coming, if at all, “kenotic” Christians should be ready to sacrifice their lives to a loving drudgery, though one imbued for them with, and ultimately grounded in, an all-suffusing empathy enabling them to see everything as it is unfolding, in the present moment. As opposed to trying to understand everything – only to have to turn around driven by an impulse to force that understanding on others. Which would spell on their part the return of internal mediation in their interactions with those they ostensibly love, but one of a very self-righteous type.

Is there a hope and scope for true empathy under liberal democracy? Could empathy win out over against the spirit of internal meditation under the system? Those are not the questions that should concern the Christian. Instead they should make sure that their empathy is vigorous and not the caricature their detractors are ready to characterize it as. This also means that they should be ready for the ultimate self-sacrifice, that of their lives, if need be.

But this seeing, empathetic attitude has its rewards that could also mimetically draw followers. It is known to free up psychic and spiritual energy that under internal mediation is badly sapped (as well as it is by the need to understand everything). Instead of relying on anger to pull oneself up by one’s own mimetic bootstraps, empathy is able to ground the person in a gestalt-like, invigorating and loving configuration where one is at one with one’s surroundings. Tensions are not removed, yet they are paradoxically held in balance, as well as are one’s past and future. After all the Cross is both a past event and a task still to be accomplished in our lives. Man is seen as a whole, with all of their spiritual and cultural endowment. Any moral attitude must be acknowledged as to the function it plays or used to play, and reconciled in the empathetic seeing. The brunt of any lacking reconciliation should be borne and/or absorbed by the follower of Christ.

Liberal democracy permits one to hold such worthy attitudes, as opposed to many if not most other political ideologies. It’s one of its blessings. Let us all work from within the system to make it better for the sake of our neighbor – and ourselves. 

Man’s Mimesis and Liberal Capitalism: Handmaids of Global Moral Change

Why is it that Western liberal moral attitudes are spreading virtually unchecked in some societies while so many people in others are scandalized by them, despite the fact that all those societies are seemingly being affected by similar globalization processes? Does it have to do with those societies’ relative closeness or distance vis-à-vis those of the West?

As always it is also worthwhile to ask in this context, or once again realize, what is the ultimate source of the moral message now associated with liberal capitalism. 

I am convinced that trying to integrate Jonathan Haidt's insights concerning man’s moral foundations into a Girardian mimetic framework is a worthwhile exercise. As has been aptly noticed, the insights of Girard and Haidt can supplement, and perhaps also correct, each other in important ways, offering a fuller picture when brought into dialogue with each other than either does on its own.

Consequently, I am also persuaded that those interplaying insights could be applied equally fruitfully now that Haidt is charting new territories, ones that from a different angle have been covered by Girard, if only incidentally (but more fully by some of his followers): man’s moral foundations with liberal capitalism as a global moral trend-setter, on the one hand, and man’s mimetic endowment as a volatile global dynamic, on the other. Scrutinizing how changes in the former might be influenced by the latter certainly promises to be rewarding.

First a few broad strokes on the situation in the West, the springboard for both theories.

Man’s moral foundations in a post-Christian world… My take on it, following the general approach of Girard and many others, is that the role of Jesus in setting in motion a process of revolutionary change starting in His homeland was fundamental. The spreading of His message, gradual and halting as it has been, is normally ascribed by Christians to supernatural causes. But the obvious truth is that only now – in a post-Christian world – are some of those changes coming to fruition, arguably with the help of liberal capitalism.

Now Jesus’ strongest concern was for the victims and the underprivileged. And so two millennia ago He set about virtually subverting those moral foundations that could not be brought in line with this paramount concern of His, especially that of the sanctity understood as pollution-avoidance, while also redefining the others [I covered that here: http://walterwilkans.blogspot.com/2015/11/jesus-paradigm-shift-in-mans-moral.html ]. But this process of cultural change is also bearing bitter fruit these days, as exemplified by the growth of victimhood culture, which apparently represents a perversion of the Christian message, including in the way it handles the issue of justice.

But why is it that some people in the West still espouse values grounded on a broader set of moral foundations, arguably thus obfuscating the primacy of victim-care, while others, seemingly including most victim advocates, apparently on a truncated one, but one where justice often is understood in an idiosyncratic if not self-serving fashion? Among many possible explanations there is one based on how capitalist liberal modernity is embraced by that system’s haves, while being rejected by its have-nots. While that might seem very simplistic, those (relative) haves and the have-nots are often taken to be mindsets given to ressentiment, which disposition not necessarily or not fully is reflective of reality.  

Mimetic theory could actually supplement the above. Let me just point to the obvious fact that Western societies currently are in a state of permanent internal mediation, with a constant threat of it breaking into scapegoating and eventually violence. The democratic electoral system actually contributes – at least for the time being – to this state being permanent, while at the same to disabling its potentially violent consequences. Just look at how many election returns are close to 50/50: voters on both sides get entrenched in their positions, while violent intergroup scapegoating on a large scale is made virtually impossible. And once you join a mimetic crowd on either side you tend to stay with it for the duration, thus reinforcing also in the process those moral preferences of yours that went into the making of your political choice.

Now in a globalizing world increasingly, and more and more rapidly, embracing some at least aspects of modern capitalism, there are indications of some of the same processes at work in places and in peoples far away from the West – and not so far away.

Those closer to home, especially in the Moslem world do not seem to be taking too well to liberal capitalism’s apparent concern for victims, though their populations certainly have considerable pockets of wealth and leisure associated in the West with such attitudes. Why?

Mimetic theory comes in handy: they are the West’s mimetic twins, en bloc, as a society. Both cultures are mutually locked in an internal mediation that does often these days actually erupt into violence. This type of mimetic reciprocity obviously largely prevents the Moslems’ acting as individuals open to what, good or bad, modern capitalism has to offer. And that seemingly includes victim care. The status of the woman is a case in point: blanket defense of their cultural/religious positions entails being closed to pertinent moral argumentation or sensitivity. And obviously the moral foundations of the regular Moslem cannot but be a solid full set, yet such where especially justice and care differ considerably from their Western equivalents, while liberty is brought into the service of the community. 

But globalization is spreading apace, capable of undermining, if not undoing, some of their shared attitudes. Social media’s role cannot be  overestimated. Yet, the more and the deeper the inroads of modernity, the more intense the internal mediation – and the more violence: such is one largely unintended, and ultimately sinister, result of social media’s presence in the Moslem world. From the perspective of the defenders of tradition, both self-appointed and official, this is how the modicum of modern capitalist attitudes they allowed and the Western technologies they failed to fully control at home, are all coming home to roost. Consequently, those attitudes must be eradicated, and technologies pressed exclusively into their own service, or at least brought under control, also at their source in the West. The insidious model/obstacle has to be eliminated. Thus the jihad brought on by an internal mediation with the West that has escalated to extremes is seen as a justifiable defensive stance. While the West in a knee-jerk fashion duly responds with the “defense of democracy” posture or involvement on the ground. Globalization enveloping mimetic doubles!

The same apparent set of outer circumstances, including a history of being subjected to Western colonialism and/or exploitation and/or war, does not result today in the same attitudes in such Far Eastern countries as China, but also Korea, Japan and others; and, astonishingly to some, Vietnam. There is good reason for that: they do not seem to see or experience the Westerners, and consequently Westerners them, as their mimetic doubles. It obviously has to do with their “native” religions and cultures being fundamentally so different from that of the West (as opposed to the latter and Islam). Probably also with the geographic distance, and, some would argue, also with the relative lesser genetic proximity. All of that makes them relatively much more secure about their identity when facing the West, and certainly much less threatened in that respect as compared to Islamic culture. The result is that their undeniably mimetic approach to the West (and vice versa) is one of external mediation, not internal. This allows their societies’ acting vis-à-vis the West in a diversified way, reflective of their members’ individual status in society (not in the largely en bloc fashion characteristic of the Moslem world, which tends to mask internal divisions).

The importance of the vilified globalization for the intersocietal distribution of liberal capitalist attitudes, including victim care, needs to be emphasized in this context. The Far East seems to be in love with globalization, benefitting from it considerably as a whole, and seemingly glossing over its sinister consequences, for the time being at least. But the latter is starting to change to some extent, the environment now seen by some as “victim” too.

Now the growing sensitivity to the fate of victims can plausibly be ascribed to Far Eastern beneficiaries of globalization taking their mimetic cues from their well-to-do Western counterparts, both groups actually living in a global village enabled by the media that capitalism developed and made available, with the rapidly growing role of social media. Oddly to some, but predictably for others, their sense of justice seems to be taking on the self-serving quality of many liberal Westerners, and that in a social environment that is much harsher economically than that in the West. 

Whereas, in a seeming cultural reversal, among the denizens of the post-Christian West there are considerable populations lacking this “victim” sensitivity or outrightly intolerant of its aims and the underlying moral message, which lack of sensitivity in the Far East they share mostly with their less-well-to-do equivalents.

This situation actually throws in bold relief another facet of globalization – and human mimesis, for that matter – that of the apparent affinity of people on analogous rungs of their respective societies. Accusations on the part of defenders of traditions, of disloyalty leading to intrasocietal disintegration and atomization of their societies thus seem justifiable. Yet modern man – busy caring for his/her choice victims, as s/he is – couldn’t care less, if s/he understands them at all. S/he is a free (wo)man, a free moral agent, after all. 

And that in turn makes it all the more easy for global corporations to conduct their global operations on a global scale – manifesting a third aspect of globalization, the most hated one. Man’s mimetic desire – at its most potent, volatile and fragile, but still largely nonviolent, or with violence well-hidden – may finally be seen here for what it naturally is or at least can be: a force of globalization. Globalization feeding on mimetic desire and working with it hand in hand – on both sides of the consumer/purveyor divide.

A few final thoughts:

Is it really justifiable to see the above, as many critics of globalization do, as a case of brinksmanship placing us all squarely but one small (mis)step away from apocalypse (not to mention the inherent rampant injustices of that process)? 

To be able to answer the first part of this question in the negative with justified assurance or hope the third Girardian mediation, the innermost mediation, would have to be introduced on a meaningful scale. In the (post-)Christian world it can only be centered on Christ, as Rene Girard made it clear. But the Far East with its rich antinomic spiritual concepts such as wu-wei, is certainly capable of providing solid foundations for its own brand or equivalent of innermost mediation. Kenosis seems to be implicit in wu-wei, just as it is pivotal in the case of true Christ-centered innermost mediation, boding well at least for man’s potential to get a handle on his mimetic desire – both East and West. But will there be enough humans mediating others into vast and peaceful expanses of their own souls for them to find there the source of their own innermost mediation – before we all self-destruct? 

In the Far East the issue is still moot, as manifested also by counterproductive calls in China to reject "Western values" and to re-embrace instead the traditional Confucian ones. Such calls can only lead that civilization into an internal mediation with the West that seemingly so far has largely been avoided. The West would then duly follow suit. (Yet Japan’s post-second-world-war history clearly demonstrates that such a development is not predetermined). 

But the issue is moot also in the West – and it would be so even in the absence of any mimetic twins closer home that are making moving in the right direction all the more difficult. The West is seemingly closer to the brink also as a result of its own internal mimetic processes, as aptly described by Girard, resulting in a situation where delusion and blindness reign.  

Could it be though that the West’s and the East’s mutual mirroring of each other at the level of external mediation that we are witnessing actually is contributing to our survival as a species at this arguably late and inherently dangerous stage of man’s development? 

We on both sides should be wary of espying ourselves in the mimetic mirror, instead of our partners in that largely mutually beneficial and nurturing mimesis, with its rather clearly differentiated yet dynamically adjusting roles, including economic ones. Before too long we would see in that mirror certain features we would be anxious about, such as resentment or hatred, and then would project them onto our newly created mimetic twins. We know it pretty well from elsewhere.

But we must not let apocalypse loom all the lager on the horizon. In this mimesis-driven globalizing world of interdividuals let us mutually keep respectful distance. If it required falling back on Christ-centered innermost mediation or, respectively, on the practice of wu-wei, so much the better for all of us if we would heed that call.  

Spiritual Pitfalls of Media-Driven Mimesis

It seems fair to say that man pulled himself up by his own mimetic bootstraps, leaving behind his animality and creating culture, religion and economy to subsist on. As well as the various media, which are both his products and extensions. They serve now as  tools with which to change his world – by propagating their contents and enabling (the pulling in of) more and more people into the mimetic dance.

The varieties of mimesis that are effected by the media tend to be by and large negative. With a medium’s growing incidence the negativity snowballs – within man’s heart and soul to begin with, and eventually enveloping societal institutions. It pushes out the good, right-brain mimesis of empathy, closing or hardening one by one all the outlets in man’s heart that enable man to act on the impulse. It also hardens man’s outlook on how societal institutions should embody empathy.

Every instance of empathetic mimesis, of being actuated by empathy, works miracles in the heart, hardwiring us all the more for love. So the question is as follows: could it be that such mimesis does not have any media to be channeled by, enlarged and communicated? Must it really be relegated to spur-of-the-moment individual reactions of effective or at least relative powerlessness? Hardly. So why is it then that the media cannot be used as virtual extensions into the wider and wider expanses of the world of man’s  empathy-channeling mirror neurons? The answer is that bad, left-brain violence-prone mimesis has been found to pay by far more handsome dividends to the media masters. 

But what about the religion of brotherly love, Christianity, apparently founded on sentiments of empathy? Are not both its teaching and practice supposed to be mediating empathy and love? Why is it failing in its task, functioning not unlike any sacrificial religion of the past? Failing to see as its calling the unceasing empathy with all the underprivileged, as shown by Jesus? So, what kind of medium into man’s heart religion actually is? Why are we not able to live out of the abundance of love that God is, naturally harmonizing with and favoring empathetic mimesis? Why even Christianity seemingly cannot resist the pull of bad mimesis? Is it because its abundant love does not seem abundant any more? But has it ever felt like that for large proportions of its adherents?

Every medium has its proper realm within man’s heart to work upon, affecting eventually societal institutions. That is an important realization, especially in view of the fact that much of media‘s insidious work is effected by the – purposeful more often than not – creation of a scarcity situation, shown and  perceived as such. Scarcity in the heart, then in society.

Scarcity moves one from an appetite-like position of craving for things necessary for one’s survival, affection and control needs, with jealousy as a spiritual danger – about choicest things around to be had or to enjoy; gluttony, lust and avarice being jealousy’s companions here – and onto the place in the heart where bad mimesis reigns, where the danger of mimetic rivalry that could degenerate into violence becomes real.

It all leads to media-instigated envy, whose “scarce” object has been created or propagated by the media. But now, depending on the type of media and one’s position relative to it (consumer or tout, including of oneself), we either stay with envy, and anger or despondency, as the case may be depending on how successful we perceive ourselves in the pursuit of the object, or we might yield to sentiments of narcissistic vainglory or hubris.

Narcissistic self-love represents a move from external to internal mediation, best in evidence when two opponents are vying for control in a mimetic dance; whereas hubris more often than not is the pitfall or actual sin of those who ostensibly surrender to innermost mediation in their hearts while aiming to be or considering themselves spiritually perfect. Even if their innermost model epitomizes charitable love, what they actually exercise then is only prideful love of self.

Radio and TV are the media of external mediation, for those on their receiving end – consumers of whatever wares, physical, spiritual, political, tempted into exercising their imagination, while celebrities as well as politicians are allowed to wallow in vanity. Everything engineered by the media masters.

And what about radio’s and TV’s empathy mediation? It is their masters’ choice to effectively block those two media, but especially TV, despite their evident capabilities, from being used in that capacity, at least on a sustained, meaningful basis. And the chief reason thereof has already been mentioned above: for the media masters another medium comes into play, drawing them into their own mimetic mediation and rivalry: money. 

Money properly belongs among the media (medium of exchange, including of societal “information” about the relative “worth” of its members ). In fact it is the most powerful among them, and one with probably second-longest history (language is first, writing follows closely).  And just as any medium, it has undergone massive changes – lending and credit, empty-money creation by governments, derivative instruments, etc. Other media fall by the wayside and disappear or become mere “figures” against a newly ascendant medium’s “ground,” money seems indestructible.

Money thrives on scarcity, in fact it is preeminent among them in that respect. Where the other media would use an adroitly tailored content to convey an impression of scarcity, for money it is enough to make itself scarce for the targeted “audiences,” so to speak, to accomplish the task. With money figure and ground fully blend.

Now digital media are already – and will be even more so in the future – a stage for vainglorious self-love, with precariousness of this narcissism showing when internal mediation all of a sudden and unexpectedly changes its polarity. But they are also a powerful undifferentiator, in a manner that neither radio nor TV have been, with all its inherent – as predicted and described by Rene Girard – dangers. They are also the undifferentiator of the traditional media preceding them, all of them – printed books, radio, TV – just figures or content of digital media’s ground, allowed varying and changeable degrees of importance by the users (a better description here than “consumers”). The big deal about digital media is their role in enhancing and extending their users’ memory function.

The transition from radio to TV represents also a move from the local or tribal to the global, whereas the current transition to digital media is a move from mere receptivity to apparent creativity, as well as to mimesis-enhancing networking, signifying a seemingly global empowerment. But what it also actually does for the moment is fanning the flames of narcissism.

Yet when and if it is truly internalized in the depths of one’s heart, when it transitions from the precarious internal mediation to innermost mediation, it might yet become truly creative. Whether it is going to be Luciferian creativity or one guided by the Holy Spirit is another matter, though. As we know Lucifer is the epitome of hubris, whereas Holy Spirit-imparted charitable love can only thrive on humility, on denial of self-love.

Digital media with their plenitude of information and networking as well as mimetic potential are a double-edged sword. They are capable on the one hand of “dividing soul and spirit asunder,” of imparting to us self-understanding and facilitating spiritual discrimination in the here and now, thus enhancing our empathy capabilities; but on the other hand, of dividing our faculty of will: “for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I,” if we succumb to spiritual pitfalls inherent in them excessively exercising media-driven, bad-mimesis-prone imagination.

Only when pursuing a life of mindfulness and contemplation and approaching digital media in a spirit of humility, as well as unceasingly falling back on our gradually developing faculty of spiritual discernment can we hope that the new media will truly empower us and help us be integrated and more loving, that they help us move freely with the Holy Spirit. That they are going to be our extensions into heaven, and not into hell.

One last thing: the notion that media content does not matter, that “the medium is the message,” as famously stated by Marshall McLuhan, is deceptive. On one hand, it seems to be taking the onus off the media masters and giving them unjustifiable leeway as to content choice, which in that situation will obviously be money-driven. On the other hand, the truth of that statement in my opinion is limited and consists only in that that the media enormously widen the scope and enhance the power of any media-carried message, which phenomenon many a time outweighs the very importance of their content. But the content matters, one might even say that the widening and enhancing makes the problem of content all the more important. And that is precisely why with the media spiritual discernment should all the more be brought into play.

Some Evagrian Insights for a Girardian Ethic

Any “Girardian” ethic would arguably have to be both truly Christian in spirit and radical: while benefitting from Mimetic Theory’s insights into the mechanisms of man’s desire, it would have to be squarely based on the commandment of mutual love, “love [of] one another just as I [Christ] have loved you,” with the commandment of nonviolence, based on Sermon on the Mount passages, figuring eminently, so as to preempt scapegoating. Moreover, one would have to be exhorted to be ready to “lay down his life for his friends,” just as did Jesus the innocent scapegoat, whose self-sacrifice was meant to bring sacrificial scapegoating to an end. The process still not completed, now it is the Girardians’ turn to carry the torch, if need be. In fact, now that humanity is denied the use/moral validity of the peace-bestowing scapegoat mechanism, their responsibility is nothing less than averting the impending apocalypse by nonviolent means. If this could only be accomplished by yet another innocent-yet-willing scapegoat, one should be ready.  He/she would be the personification of the noblest ideal of that ethic, the true embodiment of the love of neighbor, of one’s society in desperate need of peace – and love. This would be a truly Girardian twist to Jesus’ commandment of seeking “to be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”

Is it even possible to formulate such a radical ethic that could then be actually put to practice? What will be demonstrated below is that there are at least two valuable sources to draw on in attempting this task. One of them serving more as a foil rather than as a true source (Buddhism), whereas the other (early Eastern Christian thought) will hopefully be shown as being surprisingly relevant as well as useful, though its goals and scope obviously do not entirely coincide with those of a prospective Girardian enquiry.

Firstly, it must be noted that nothing even close to such a radical ethic has so far been formulated in historical Christianity, and even practice of the much less demanding "love of one’s neighbor as oneself" commandment has been mostly dismal. It is Buddhism, both  in its dharma and to some extent also in its practice, that is seemingly much closer to the spirit of both Christian “love” and “nonviolence” commandments, though it arrives there from an entirely different set of basic ontological and anthropological assumptions. Paradoxically, the latter apparently have some common ground with Girardian anthropology, though their broader respective general outlooks are markedly different.

The uncanny similarity consists not only in that that both Buddhism and Mimetic Theory assign a pivotal role to desire but also in that the Mimetic-Theory-posited triangular nature of human desire unmistakably evinces the inherent nothingness of the desiring man. And though arguably this nothingness is not metaphysical or ontological (contrary arguments could also be put forward), but rather psychological, a Buddhist flavor is undeniable. Moreover, this psychological nothingness has far-reaching consequences for man as a moral agent. The Girardian mimetic interdividual comes across as much more nihilistic at his/her core than the stand-alone Buddhist pursuing his/her path of avoidance of suffering, but one imbued with loving-kindness towards their fellow humans. That love goes to redeem the Buddhist’s apparent nihilism, something that the “basic” Girardian interdividual seems to be lacking altogether.

In my opinion, moreover, it is a misperception, or misrepresentation, as the case may be, to treat Buddhism as ontologically nihilistic. Buddha’s supposed nihilism, as embodied in his no-self teaching, arguably is pedagogical in nature. It is expected to drive home his fundamental Anicca teaching, having to do with the basic impermanence of existence. On the psychological plane it can only be expected to have a lasting imprint if the metaphor of no-self is employed. And, it can be plausibly argued, that that is what Buddha actually did. I posit that a prospective MT ethic could benefit from the use of that seemingly nihilistic metaphor – at least at its mystical limits, namely when Christ-the-innermost model is to be imitated. As will be shown later on, it bears on the interplay of true love and love of self.

As mentioned above, Buddhism ties in most clearly with MT in that both assign a crucial role to desire. Buddhism, which does not view it as mimetic, has only a negative opinion of any form of desire, treating it as something to be avoided or detached from. No mileage here from this basic human endowment, responsible, as it is, for much of human learning, among other things. But not much either in MT, at least hardly anything positive as far as man as a moral agent is concerned. In both Buddhism and in MT human desire stands condemned, although on different counts.

Neither does calling MT’s internal model/obstacle of desire “metaphysical” amount to much, at least again not much positive. Yet this appellation might in fact be Girard’s giveaway of his deep intuitions. But any ontology built on a Girardian metaphysical model that is seemingly essentially negative would appear nihilistic. Unfortunately, even the moral potential of imitating the innermost model is left largely unexplored, this time possibly as this would draw Girard into yet another field altogether, namely that of theology, or even mysticism.

So it may have been Girard’s fear of nihilism permeating Mimetic Theory, as it arguably does when mimetic desire is seen as taking center stage in man, and that consequently could also compromise any ethic that might supplement it, that was decisive for his refrainment from any formulation of an ethical system on top of his anthropology. Yet given the highly moralistically charged nature of his thought AND his professed Christianity, such an effort would seem only natural. Obviously it cannot be precluded that, conceiving himself first and foremost as an anthropologist, he simply wanted to maintain purity of discourse and thus consciously chose to abstain from any foray into the field, at least in any systematic form.

Yet despite all those reservations an ethic crowning Mimetic Theory is certainly not only feasible but also called for. And from the point on in the development of MT when its author posited the innermost mediator/model, namely Jesus Christ, as the model to imitate, it need not have been nihilistic. Instead, it would have been an ethic of love. The Redeemer would have redeemed MT’s nihilism.

Now any rigorous formulation of a “Girardian” ethic, Christian – not Buddhist – in character as it doubtless would have to be, would certainly benefit from insights afforded by the early Church’s Eastern Fathers and other spiritual writers. The thought of Evagrius Ponticus, a fourth century desert monk, is especially valuable. He developed a set of eight logismoi, or evil passions, ever ready to attack man. (They eventually became the basis for the Western Church’s seven deadly sins.) What is even more important for this discussion is that they all are said to stem from the fundamental or root passion, that of philautia, or self-love.

Instead of treating the logismoi as separate entities, I tend to see them as so many manifestations of love of self. Such an approach is especially useful when collating the unfolding of the stages of mimetic desire at work in man with the Christian’s quest for perfection (or holiness or theosis, divinization), where self-love is found to be the soul’s chief obstacle to loving both God and neighbor (the basis of any Christian ethic), rearing its ugly head as it does in various situations as one is navigating one’s life. It becomes especially evident at the top of both processes, when, on the one hand, the mimesis-riven man is exhorted to fall back on Christ in His capacity of innermost model, and when, on the other hand, the Christian realizes that perfection in this lifetime is only attainable by way of self-denial nourished by loving contemplation of God.

The move from the regular external triangular mimetic desire to the “metaphysical” desire of the model’s/ (internal) mediator's/ obstacle’s being, and to the desire of the innermost model/ mediator (and only when untrue to form can this model be felt as an obstacle),  actually signifies or is paralleled by a gradual transformation, then a collapse of the mimetic triangle.

Especially when the mimetic relationship resembles a tug of war this transformation consists in that one of the vertices – that of the object of desire – is replaced by a mental/spiritual construct of love of self, or, love with one’s self, real or only perceived as such in the model by the (permanently or temporarily) weaker party. But if the protagonist – in dire need of reasserting himself when being spurned, humiliated or neglected by his very model/obstacle – is able to hold his ground, and fall back on his own narcissistic self-love to now propagate himself as an ostensibly lovable object of desire, first in his own eyes, then, hopefully, in the eyes of his (all of a sudden erstwhile) model/ obstacle, we might yet be witnessing a veritable mimetic dance. All that is fueled by vanity, or rather self-love manifesting itself as vanity, if not becoming vanity or vainglory itself.

Incidentally, the mimetic triangle never becomes a true quadrangle, thus testifying to the precariousness of narcissistic self-love: even in a relationship marked by an internal mediation that turns into a tug of war, the two phantoms of self-love will not coexist. When one is gaining the upper hand, the other is being depleted: sapped of its energy and bled dry by the one in the ascendant, its “owner” wallowing in despair – until the tide turns. 

The virtual collapse of the mimetic triangle can only happen if and when the innermost model is felt as legitimately demanding renunciation of either one’s being (cf. Buddhism, which actually holds that there is no self as such, following on its fundamental tenet of impermanence of everything), or of one’s self-love (mystical Christianity; but with no self-love and the collapse of the triangle also the very self of the mystic disappears, and the mystic falls back on Christ the source of his/her being and fount of his/her love – nothing but Christ in place of self; here spiritual pride or hubris is the main threat to the real disappearance of self-love, self-love manifesting itself as, or actually being hubris).

It is worth reaffirming here that as long as self-love reasserts itself in the mystic, his/her love cannot be or mirror that of Christ’s; it is spurious, a mere lifeless imitation thereof. Such is the unequivocal teaching of virtually all the early Christian writers from the East, as well as many from the West. Some Easterners, being truly Trinitarian in their views on man's union with God, held also that man's Christ-like kenosis can lead him/her to participation in the sharing of love between the Hypostases of the Trinity. Now that would also signify a mystical reemergence of the triangle, this time fully embedded in man's heart and much transformed: the ever dynamic figure letting, upon eradication of self-love, man's desire to be both truly loving as well as truly loved, find unceasing fulfillment. His/her theosis would now be full, manifesting itself as a radiance not unlike that of Jesus on Mount Tabor, as a passing-through of God's love to the world around. 

Among various formulations of man’s spiritual trichotomy – in contradistinction to the psychological dichotomy of body and soul – the Christian East posited the existence of the “spiritual” or rational soul at the pinnacle of man’s soul, there being lower down also the irascible soul and the concupiscent one. As mentioned above, Evagrius Ponticus fleshed out that construction with his proposition of eight logismoi, understood as evil passions, thoughts or even demons, eager to beset the human soul, each of them assigned to one of its three levels. Only pride and vainglory are proper to the spiritual soul, whereas envy – initially operative in mimetic desire – is proper to the irascible soul (Evagrius calls it “sadness” – at fellow men’s possessing or enjoying something, for some also at one's reactions of this sort; Gregory the Great renamed it “envy”). The other logismoi of the irascible soul are anger and acedia (listlessness verging on despair), whereas those of the concupiscent one are gluttony, lust and avarice.  

That delimitation uncannily dovetails with that that one could infer from Girard: the various stages and shades of a man’s quest to have his/her other-created desire met is splendidly characterized by the evil passions of the irascible soul; the two categories might naturally be viewed as the two sides of the same coin. Envy is almost always accompanied by anger or resentment, especially when frustrated, and can eventually turn “acedic.” This type of desire clearly is not appetitive in nature, it requires a mediator, who tends to be internalized while becoming an obstacle. Internal mediation is that type of mimetic mediation of desire that is most characteristic of someone in whom envy is coupled with anger or resentment.
 

Appetites are the domain of the concupiscent soul (sometimes also called “bodily soul”), although each of them can easily devolve into an other-generated desire, where all bounds and propriety are abandoned as the soul  is instigated to desire in excess of what would normally satisfy the respective appetite, or to desire objects not really needed to have it satisfied. The starting point here is what Girard calls external mediation, and at its initial stages desire pivots on an external object in possession of the mediator. 

Now if even those desires that are appetite-based, meaning that they are appetites in the absence of any model/mediator,  and only become mimetic desires – with their characteristic structure and crescendo of intensity – if and when models do appear, it is obvious that in human interactions there is actually no escaping their attendant rivalries, regardless of whether there actually is any scarcity to create or exacerbate them. And they tend to be sinister, easily degenerating into scapegoating and finally even into physical violence.

As the above clearly shows, and bearing in mind that according to Mimetic Theory the only model of desire worth imitating is Jesus Christ, any positive ethic built on it could only be radical: nothing short of a thoroughgoing effort at eliminating the self-love at the root of all the “bad” varieties of mimetic desire would do. And that would certainly have to include being vigilant and honest as to one’s real motivations behind the ostensible pursuit of Christ-the-model, impinging as they must on Christ's innermost mediation of man's metaphysical desire (succumbing to pride and narcissistic vainglory that beset one's spiritual soul preeminent among them).  In short, what would be called for would be an ethic advocating and incarnating the elimination of self-love, manifesting itself in various insidious forms described by Evagrius, an ethic of spiritual discernment and spiritual yet very practical asceticism, pointing to and leading man onto a way of contemplative yearning to become one with the model, to thus fill the vacuum at one’s center left by the emptying of the self of a self-love constituting that very self.

By way of conclusion: drawing on Evagrian thought (bolstered by some Buddhist insights) an attempt has been made to set out the basic ideas for a future expansion of Mimetic Theory into a formulation of “Girardian” ethic.  

In no particular order there follow some of its preliminary yet pivotal tenets:

·         Pursue the way of prayerful contemplation – to be transparent to God’s love, dissolving any barriers to it that also constitute one’s self.

·         Be guided by the metaphor of no-self also on returning to the world; “no-self but love” as one’s operative principle in order to be actuated by God’s love.

·         Spiritually discern the workings of various manifestations of self-love in one’s soul.

·         In light of the above, discern those manifestations within the movements of one’s mimetic desire, in order to defuse mimetic crises and rivalries.

·         Abide by Jesus’ “new commandment” of “loving one another just as I [Christ] have loved you.”

·         Be ready for martyrdom: ready to “lay down one’s life for one’s friends,” including as a latter-day scapegoat, if need be.

·         Abide by the principle of nonviolence; when fighting a particular case of injustice this would entail developing a deliberate strategy.

In modern, largely urban setting such an ethic could be tentatively called “open world ethic of no-self mysticism,” or “no-self mimetic ethic of mysticism in the world,” or “no-self ethic of urban mysticism,” or “mimetic mystical ethic of no-self,” or something along these lines, possibly employing also the Girardian term “interdividual.”

Mysticism as outlined above is in line with the sentiment expressed by some twentieth century Christian thinkers that religion (meaning Christianity) would either be mystical or would disappear altogether. While this might not be so, in a Girardian context and if the analysis above is valid, one is fully entitled to say that man, wildly mimetic and interdividual that he is, humanity as such, and the world could only be saved from apocalypse if man’s moral strivings were carried to their mystical limits, as described above.